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ABSTRACT 
"Only when public administration fully accepts and prepares to meet the challenge of 
achieving efficient and effective crisis management will we see a significant reduction 
in human suffering and econornic loss due to unnecessary exposure of people and 
property to the risks associated with a cornplex, technological, urban society." W.J. 
Petak (1 985) 
Emergency management and the coordination of disaster-related activity are information- 
intensive, both in terms of the level of detail required and the diversity of information that must 
be generated, evaluated, and acted upon. Because the effectiveness of the information system 
supporting emergency management influences the success of disaster response, a 
cornmensurate level of attention to the system through which this information travels is 
necessary. 
Although organizations at ail three orders of govemment in Canada are dedicated to 
emergency management, there are indicators that the response structure may be somewhat ad- 
hoc and that the information system used to support crisis decision-making may not be fully 
capable of serving the cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency effort usualty associated with disaster 
response. To optimize coordination in crises, public offkials involved in the policy and 
administration of emergency management must better appreciate and more fully address the 
distinctive communication and information requirements surrounding emergency management. 
Senhg as a baseline for this study were the various criticisms, made post-Red River 
Basin flood of 1997, that overall coordination across the municipal, provincial and federal 
jurisdictions was lacking and that decision-making and response activity, in general, were 
delayed. Based on the literature reviewed, the interviews conducted, the authofs personal 
experience, and the use of Stnictured Systems Analysis and Design Methodology, this shidy 
proposes a simple and effective cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency information modet for 
emergency management. 
A well-designed information system is "the most important tool of crisis managementn 
(Heath, 1999). The model proposed in this paper is one upon which subsequent design and 
irnplementation of such a system may be undertaken. 
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CHAPTER d - SlTUATlNG THE STUDY 
Introduction 
Emergency' management is not generally considered in the rnainstream of Public 
Administration. Nevertheless, disasters experienced in the 1990s, and their consequent 
social, economic, and political consequences, are moving this discipline into the national 
political spotlight. Provincial and federal governments have responded to recent natural and 
man-made disasters with financial and other supports. Events such as the avalanche of 
February 2000 in Kangiqsualujjuaq, Quebec, the Swiçç Air disaster off the coast of Nova 
Scotia in 1999, the Ontan'olQuebec ice storms of 1998, and the Red River Basin flood of 
1997 have brought issues of emergency management to the attention of the public. 
Emergency management organizations at al1 three levels of govemrnent are specifically 
dedicated to the coordination of emergency management activities2 and to the 
administration of disaster financial assistance programs. This thesis examines a crucial 
aspect of emergency management, namely the generation and utilization of information to 
guide decision-making in crisis situations. 
Background 
In Canada, the responsibility for emergency management rests primarily with the 
Local Authority (LA)=. Provincial, territorial and federal governments recognize, however, 
1 For the purposes of this chapter, the terni 'emergency" will, unless otherwise specified, 
be used interchangeably with similar terrns such as 'crisis" and "disaster." The term "crisis," 
however, is more fully developed at Chapter two. 
2 There is unanimous agreement in the litemture that the four phases typical of ernergency 
management activity are mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. These phases are 
not necessarily sequential nor are they mutually exclusive of one another. Each one 
encompasses cornplex and often elaborate activities that require the participation of cross- 
jurisdictional and rnulti-agency officiais and practitioners of emergency management (Grant, 
1996). See Glossary for definitions of italicized terrns. 
3 The iA is typically defined by provincial and territorial legislation as (a) the council of an 
incorporated northem community, (b) the council of a municipality, (c) the council of an 
incorporated city, town or village, (d) the resident administrator or council of a local government 
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that in the course of protecting life and rninimizing the destruction to property, the LA may 
eventually become overwhelrned by the event and rnay exhaust its financial, human and 
other resources. At that point, the LA can, under existing statutes. cal1 for the support of the 
next higher level of govemment. In fonal  and legal terms, however, the LA maintains 
responsibility for the overall direction and control of response operations. 
Canadian emergency planning guidelines suggest that, at the first level of 
responsibility, i.e., at the LA level, the requirement for information4 is initially contained 
within the boundaries of the affected area. Local immediate response agencies such as 
police, fire and ambulance services will be communicating with the local Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC)5, which is typically staffed by municipal officials and 
representatives of ernergency services. lndustry and other private sector institutions in the 
imrnediate area may likewise be feeding information into the local emergency management 
system, as might volunteer agencies and non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) which 
are also on-location. 
When, in the course of the crisis, local resources are no longer adequate or 
sufficient to continue the fight to protect life and property, a request for provincial assistance 
is necessary. In anticipation of this request for assistance, the provincial or temtorial 
Emergency Management Organization (€MO), on behalf of the minister responsible for the 
legislation regarding emergency mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, is 
district, (e) the provincial or territorial authority responsible for Native jurisdictions, (f) the 
provincial or territorial authority responsible for (i) provincial or temtorial parks, (ii) Crown lands, 
and (iii) wildlife management areas or wildlife rekrges, (g) the Minister of lndian Affairs and 
Northem Oevelopment appointed under the lndian  AC^ (Canada) with respect to a reserve as 
defined by that Act, (h) The Minister of National Defence with respect to a Canadian Forces 
Base, and (i) the Minister responsible for national parks under the National Parks  AC^ (Canada) with 
respect to a national park. 
4 See Glossary. 
s See Gtossary. 
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already monitoring the situation and is in cornmunication with those ministries and agencies 
that rnay be called upon to provide support. 
Once the province or territory has entered into the situation, the inforrnation 
requirements naturally increase. Moreover, the information system6 expands, becomes 
more complex and demands integration. Information not only continues to flow horizontally 
on the local plane but rnust now travel vertically to the provincial or temtorial Emergency 
Operations Coordination Centre (EOCC)' and from there honzontally again to the 
departments involved. communications8 are further complicated by the fact that staff and 
resources belonging to various departments, agencies, NGOS, industry and other systemsg 
may already be in location, i.e., at the disaster site, and vital decision-making information 
may already be travelling directly to their parent comrnand posts or operations centres in 
addition to, or to the exclusion of, the local EOC and the provincial or temtorial EOCC. 
Eventually, when a provincial or territorial govemment has exhausted its resources 
in support of disaster response activities, the provincial minister responsible for provincial 
or territorial emergency measures legislation will request the support of the federal 
government from the federal rninister responsible for the Emergency Act (Minister of National 
Defence). Once the federal govemrnent and its resources become involved and another 
layer of coordination is appended to the already complex communication network, the 
information requirements are increased dramatically. A good example of the complexity 
6 See Glossary. 
7 See Glossary. 
8 See Glossary. 
9 Wide reaching departments such as those involved in the provision of health, social 
services, highways and transportation have extensive information nehvorks supplernentary to the 
existing local and wide area networks serving al1 departments. ltalicized terms are further 
defined at the Glossary. 
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that can anse from cross-jurisdictional. multi-agency response is the Canadian portion of 
the Red River Basin flood of 1997. The response for this emergency involved the federal 
govemment, 8,000 troops from the Canadian Forces, the Manitoba provincial government 
through a number of departrnents and agencies, seven rural municipalities, the City of 
Winnipeg, six towns, one lndian Reserve, several NGOs (e.g., the Salvation Amy, the 
Mennonite Disaster Relief Committee, the Red Cross), church groups, the private sector, 
and several hundred thousand volunteers. 
Staternent of the Problern 
The conduct of local emergency management activities, such as situation monitoring 
and decision-making (i.e., properly determining pnonties, effectively allocating resources, 
and selecting the better courses of action) is contingent on the ability and capacity to 
transmit, receive, share, and interpret meaningful1O information. As the conceptual 
representation of the existing information flow at Figure 1 depicts, the involvement of 
several levels of government and multiple other agencies adds to the complexity of ensuring 
that key players receive the information necessary to effect optimum performance and 
decision-making . 
Various reports published after the Red River Basin flood of 1997 identified 
problems relating to communications and to the impact these problems may have had on 
the decision-making process within the emergency response structure. For example, The 
Ernst and Young Report, cornrnissioned by the Province of Manitoba to review and evaluate 
its emergency preparedness and response to the event, stated that the province's 
departmental response was uncoordinated and that information was not properly shared 
(1998, p. 28). The report went on to explain that each provincial department had its own 
IO Wilensky (1 967) posits that meaningful information must have six characteristics It must 
be clear, tirnely, reliable, valid, comprehensive and diverse. 
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difficulty in obtaining information from provincial departments was a great concern to the 
decision-makers at the LA Jevel (Tait and Rahman, 1997, p. 46). Tait and Rahman noted 
'differential rates of communication in the actions of some govemment departrnents." 
'Ownenhip of the problem." according to their findings, "seemed to be one of the 
contributhg factors to this difficulty. When departments did not see a problem as their own, 
reactions to it were uneven" (Ibid.. p. 35). 
Those interviewed by the Emst and Young consulting fim perceived that 'political" 
barriers, such as partisan political disagreernents, could also have been responsible for the 
*stymiedn openness between participants and for the general unwillingness to share 
information (1998, p. 28). Each provincial department was perceived as wanting to be the 
expert. As an unintended consequence of running independently, the provincial 
departrnents were reported to have, at times, provided conflicting information to the public 
and to the other departments and agencies responding to the event (Ibid.). 
Conflicting information was also generated as a result of a failure to provide central 
coordination and to establish clear authority for the release of information to the media. For 
example, while LA officiais were reassunng their municipalities that they were not going to 
be evacuated, the provincial EMO was içsuing evacuation orders (Ernst and Young, 1998, 
p. 32). Many felt that provincial authorities could have been more pro-active with the media 
and that the delivery of media interviews needed to be better planned (Ibid.). The news 
media tend to sensationalize information in an effort to scoop the story, and measures to 
prevent rumours and to quash "infonal* information networks should have been taken 
(1 bid.). Media relations, Le.. communication between news reporters and the public, as well 
as between news reporters and those who were responsible for the management of 
ernergency response, could have been improved (Ibid.). 
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More problems relating to the passage of meaningful information included a lack of 
full-tirne and experienced provincial liaison staff at the disaster sites to gather local 
intelligence, to facilitate the flow of information, to filter out redundant and extraneous 
information, and to help prioritize resource requests (Ibid., p. 30). As a consequence of this 
shortfall, provincial department personnel, including staff at the EOCC. were unfamiliar with 
the local conditions and incapable of incorporating local knowledge into their decision- 
making and recommendations (Ibid., p. 31; Tait and Rahman, 1997, pp. 30-31). LAS were 
treated as though they al1 faced the same threat, had the same response capabilities, and 
faced identical impacts (Tait and Rahman, 1997, p. 30). The knowledge and advice of local 
experts and inhabitants seemed to have been ignored by provincial authorities and the 
military (Ibid.. p. 19; Manitoba Water Commission, 1998. p. 86). Exacerbating the lack of 
liaison staff at the LA and compounding the problem of miscornmunication and 
misunderstanding was the lack of LA representation on EMO cornmittees (Manitoba Water 
Commission, 1998, p. 87). 
The absence of a dedicated Liaison Officer (LO) at the LA compelled its personnel 
to cal1 the EOCC directly to pass information. Unfortunately, the information received from 
these sources was often improperly "packaged," uncoordinated, and at times, contradictory 
(Ernst and Young, 1998, p. 30). The information throughput to the EOCC was 
overwhelming. Moreover, because of the large volume of oral versus written information, 
and a lack of common terminology, information was often miscommunicated and 
misunderstood (1 bid.). 
The sheer volume of incoming telephone calls was not only dificult to manage, it 
overioaded the EOCC resources. On more than one occasion, when City of Winnipeg 
officials attempted to cal1 the EOCC, the telephone was not answered (City of Winnipeg. 
1998, p.15). At other times, city staff was instnicted by EOCC duty personnel to cal1 back 
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on a public access telephone line, which not surprisingly, was also very busy (Ibid.). 
Because of the EOCC's inability to properiy manage the large number of incoming calls, LA 
personnel ended up calling individual provincial departrnents directiy to pass on or to 
receive infonation (Ernst and Young, 1988. p. 30). In spite of their efforts, the 
southemmost LAS received no official infonation regarding the actions being taken by the 
neigbouring state of North Dakota (Tait and Rahman, 1987, p. 47). 
Even the cellular telephone network overloaded at times, causing the loss of cellular 
telephone communication (Tait and Rahman, 1997, p.46). Although an informal and 
altemate communication network was established by the LAS to obtain advice and support 
from each other pnor to the occurrence of the disaster, during the fiooding this network was 
also lost (lbid.). Facsimile transmission devices (fax) were used routinely to communicate 
between LAS and the EOCC. Unfortunately, these too proved to be inefficient (Emst and 
Young. 1998. p. 31; City of Winnipeg, 1998, p. 14). Information generated from trusted 
agents, either at the flood-threatened locations or at the EOCC, often amved up to 24 hours 
late with the result that responses from the decision-makers at the LAS and provincial 
govemment were not as timely as they should have been (Emst and Young. 1998, p. 31). 
Consequently, LAS and the EOCC relied on more readily available media channels for their 
necessary information and thus incurred the delays and filtering inherent in news reporting 
(lbd.). It is not surprising that 'the LAS [and the provincial govemment] reported delayed 
response, difficulty in getting rapid advice. insufficient information. insufficient consultationsl 
and inconsistent communications" (Tait and Rahman, 1997, pp. 30,46). 
Problems within the emergency response structure also contributed to the 
information system shortfalls experienced during this event. Specifically, provincial 
departments followed policy guidelines set by their departments ministries instead of those 
policies and decisions set by the Central Task Team (CT). which was comprised of 
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departmental representatives, as established in the Manitoba Emergency Plan, to 
coordinate the overall provincial response to crises (Ernst and Young, 1998, p. 28). Tait 
and Rahman reported widespread belief that the emergency response structure outlined in 
the provincial emergency plan, represented at Figure 2, did not work (1997, p. 30). 
The City of Winnipeg's Report on its own response to the flood of 1997 claimed that: 
"[the] CTT did not meet on a regular basis, Nor was it clear whether or not the 
Flood Cornmittee (a subcommittee of the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness 
Cornmittee) was intended to act in addition to, or instead of, the Cm. For the 
meetings which did occur the dates, times, chairman and attendees were al1 quite 
variable. Furthermore, there were not agendas, minutes, or other records kept of 
each meeting. Sorne meetings were either convened or cancelled on short notice. 
For several of the meetings, both Water Resources and Highways were not present 
and, arguably, these were the two lead departments in the provincial response" (City 
of Winnipeg, 1998, p. 15). 
The Ernst and Young report explained that. as the emergency progressed, the coordination 
and tasking role of the CTT deteriorated into one of 'micro-managing" and that the authority 
may have shifted to the provincial Deputy Ministers' Cornmittee along the way (1 998. p. 21). 
The Deputy Ministers' Cornmittee comprises Deputy Ministers from the various 
departments responding to the event. Members of the cornmittee convene to infom, 
advise, and to make recommendations to the Minister responsible for the Emergency 
Measures Act with respect to the provincial response. It implements the direction of the 
Minister and provides direction to the provincial departments within the response structure 
(Province of Manitoba, 1999, p. 18). 
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Figure 2 - Ernergency Response ~tructure" 
1 t Extracted fiom the Manitoba Emergency Plan, 1999, p. 9. 
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As the authority shifted, key personnel no longer attended the CIT meetings, partly 
because cabinet meetings were being held concurrently and partly because they perceived 
the erosion of the CTT's role and the drift of its members into narrower, more isolated 
deicison-making bodies had a correspondingly negative effect on the coordinating role of 
the provincial EMO (Ibid.). The Water Commission Report's findings indicated that LA 
officials were indeed confused as to what were the role and responsibilities of EMO and 
who was ultirnately in charge (1998, p. 86). 
Adding to the confusion, the complications of the information flow, and the 
constraints to decision-making were two separate structures of emergency management 
(namely, the 'cooperation and coordinationn and 'command and controln structures) which 
coexisted during the entire period in which the military provided support to the province's 
flood of 1997. 
The "cooperation and coordinationn structure argues that organizational adaptability 
and operational flexibility are critical to the successful management of a crisis (Kuban, n.d.. 
p. 8). Because disasters demand a cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency response, one 
organization's actions will invariably influence the outcome of the actions of others. The 
"cooperation and coordinationn structure is designed to allow for this condition, as well as 
for variations in resource availability, junsdictions, operational requirements, and 
organizational structures. In the 'cooperation and coordinationn model, the facilitation of 
inter-agency cooperation throughout the emergency management process is critical (Ibid.). 
Furthemore, in keeping with the Canadian practice of emergency management, the 
"cooperation and coordinationn structure respects the jurisdiction of the LA, emphasizing the 
responsibility that elected officials have to their constituents. It retains responsibility for 
response with those who have the best knowledge of their community. Finally, it implies the 
involvement, collaboration, and coordination of al1 key players in the emergency 
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management pmcess (Ibid.). 
The 'command and controln structure used by the military, on the other hand, has 
an entirely different focus. NATO defines command as 'the authority vested in an individual 
of the arrned forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forcesn (1 988), and 
it defines control as "that authority which may be less than full comrnand exercised by a 
commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations. or other organizations 
not normally under his cornmandn (Ibid.). According to Pigeau and McCann, command is 
typically characterized as an attribute or a set ofattributes, whereas control is characterized 
as a process or an aggregate of processes (1 995, p. 2). When command and control are 
used together, the result is the amalgamation of both definitions, i.e., an attribute that is 
manifested through the authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned 
forces, and a process whose purpose is to perfon functions through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures (Ibid.). 
A key finding of the interviews conducted by Emst and Young was that the 
'cooperation and coordinationn structure, characterized by looseness and flexibility, shifted 
to the 'command and control" structure, characterized by rigidity and hierarchy (1 998, p. 
18). Equally important was the finding that no procedures were in place to manage the shift 
(Ibid., p. 19). Notwithstanding this diffÎculty, the interviewees at the Emst and Young Report 
unanimously agreed that these two structures did 'not dovetail well togethef (Ibid., p. 18). 
Overall, the involvement of the Canadian Forces was appreciated. Nevertheless, 
the LAS were fnistrated that the on-site military had limited authority and that al1 actions 
requested by the LA had to be directed up and cleared by rhe chain-of-command (Emst and 
Young, 1998, p. 29; Tait and Rahman. 1997. p. 14). Chainof-command decision-making 
caused, what was perceived as, unnecessarily long delays in obtaining authorkations for 
action, inconsistent decisions over tirne, and the countermanding of previously agreed 
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decisions (Tait and Rahman. 1997, p. 31). As a consequence of misunderstanding the 
"command and controln structure, effective communication channels between the LAS and 
the military were not established (Ernst and Young, 1998, p. 29). Moreover, because it 
appeared that the military's role was different from the one the LAS would have assigned 
to it, the LAS felt their control of the emergency was being challenged. They also felt that 
the military was overly cautious, unable or unwilling to use local expertise, slow to respond 
to local requests and needs, and reluctant to share information the L4s did not have (Ibid.; 
Tait and Rahman, 1997, p. 14). 
Although the military viewed its assistance to the province of Manitoba as 'extrernely 
successfu 1," it too reported certain informational and decision-making issues that contributed 
to problems encountered. For example, it recognized that both military and civil authorities 
had limited knowledge and understanding of the concepts, limitations to and procedures for 
the conduct of military support to provincial emergencies. The distinction between types 
of assistance to civil authorities and their related limitations were not widely undentood 
within the military chah-of-command or by the civil authorities (Deputy Chief of Defence 
Staff, 1997, pp. A-2 - A-3, A-5). 
Moreover, the military found that it lacked comprehensive joint operations 
procedures and information system compatibility (Jbid.. pp. A-3 - A-4). The Deputy Chief 
of Defence Staff Lessons Leamed Report indicated that certain difficulties were 
encountered in establishing a "cornmon denominator" that would ensure a force-wide 
communication network. The Report also indicated that the military had difficulty using 
information from outside sources as well as from within the Joint Task Force network. For 
example, some sub-units could not communicate with each other (Ibid.). 
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Not unlike the LA, the Canadian Forces also experienced frustration in dealing with 
an unfamiliar structure. Ignorance of the differences behnreen military and civilian methods 
of operations (e.g., staff structure, decision-making process, planning principles) created 
friction and tension (Ibid., p. A-9). Further complications were experienced in dealing 
directly with federal, provincial, and municipal levels of govemment and in 'de-conflictingn 
the distinct agendas and authorities of each (Ibid.). However. the Deputy Chief of Defence 
Staff Lessons Learned Report stated that a bridge of understanding, credibility and trust 
was eventually constmcted. It further elaborated that affer directed effort and adjustrnent, 
effective and comprehensive civil-military cooperation was finally established (Ibid., pp. A-8 
- A-9). 
The informational and decision-making concems reported by Ernst and Young, Tait 
and Rahman, 8ennett, the City of Winnipeg, the Water Commission Report, and the military 
constitute but a small portion of the observations and concerns raised regarding the 
management of the Red River Basin flood of 1997. Nevertheless, the importance of the 
information system. particularly as it relates to the process of decision-making, is vital to 
emergency management. Accurate and timely information is the lifeline of any 
management system. but it is particularly critical in disasters (Kuban, n.d., p. 10). Disaster 
management systems must enhance existing organizational structures and information 
transfer patterns. Moreover, effective disaster management systems must also facilitate the 
flow of information across organizational boundaries. as well as between the response 
agencies and the public (lbid.). The key to efficient and effective response management 
is the Ievel of information transfer that occurs between decision-rnakers and between the 
decision-makers and the cornmunity (Tait and Rahman. 1997, p. 35). Bennett goes so far 
as to suggest that some of the losses experienced dumg the flood of i 997 were probably 
attributable, in part, to poor or nonexistent communications and the absence of shared 
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understanding of the issues to be addressed (1998, p. 16). 
Despite the foregoing informational and communication deficiencies, and seemingly 
more by good luck than by good design. the local authonties, volunteer agencies and 
NGOs, industry, and the provincial and federal departments who played a part were 
generally able to meet the challenges posed by the 1997 flood disaster. In the main, the 
citizen's perception was that the province. the federal govemment. and particularly, the 
Canadian Forces put together a massive cooperative effort to mount a successful response 
to an emergency that threatened more than 70 percent of Manitoba's population. The 
general public was left with a sense of extreme gratitude. However. future crises are a 
certainty, and a similar or larger flood will manifest itself one spring. Therefore. to improve 
their ernergency management policies and practices, elected officials, appointed public 
officials. and other actors involved must strive to ensure future responses will be based on 
the best informed decision-making and best coordinated action possible. 
Thesis Staternent 
Irrespective of the disaster's scope or the level of govemmental support to the crisis, 
emergency management and the coordination of disaster-related activity is infomation- 
intensive, both in terms of the level of detail required and the diversity of information that 
must be generated, evaluated, and acted upon. It follows that a cornmensurate level of 
attention to the system through which this information travels is necessary. In fact, the 
system, which facilitates the transfer of information between key players, is critical to the 
success of emergency management and to a coordinated, cross-jurisdictional. and multi- 
agency effort. It is vital for public officials involved in the policy and administration of 
emergency management to have a thorough understanding of the communication and 
information requirements in order to maximize effective performance and decision-making 
in cn'sis situations. 
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Using the problerns reported from the Red River Basin flood of 1997 as a baseline, 
and on the basis of the literature reviewed, the interviews conducted, personal experience, 
and the Structured Systems Analysis and Design methodology, this study proposes a 
simple and effective cross-jurisdictional and rnulti-agency information model in support of 
emergency management. 
Methodology 
This study provides a practical examination of the information system framework in 
support of decision-making in disaster situations and, proposes a simple and effective 
information model for cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency use which addresses those 
problems identified in the above 'statement of the problem." This model should be 
generally applicable to any future disaster situation. 
The study uses the informational and decision-making aspects of the Red River 
Basin flood of 1997, as presented in the following government sponsored and non- 
govemment sponsored after-action reports, as a basis for the generation of an information 
model in support of decision-making: 
Cl the Ernst and Young Report, which was commissioned by the provincial 
governrnent to review and evaluate the emergency preparedness and 
response of the Manitoba Emergency Management Organization with the 
object of providing recommendations to improve those areas requiring 
improvement, 
Q the Manitoba Water Commission Report, an interna1 and independent 
review of actions taken by the provincial govemment during the 1997 flood 
in order to provide recommendations, 
0 the Disaster Research Institute (University of Manitoba) Report, which was 
written for the International Red River Basin Task Force of the International 
Joint Commission, identifying the views of the principal oficials of the Rural 
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Municipalities and making recommendaüons based on discrepancies 
between their perceptions and 'best practices," 
O the City of Winnipeg's Report on its own response to the 1997 flood, written 
as required by the City's ernergency plan and as requested by the Chief 
Commissioner in order to present an intemallydeveloped self-assessrnent 
with recornrnendations for improvement, 
Q the Canadian Forces After-Action Reports, written by al1 three 
Environmental Cornmands (land, sea, and air) for National Defence 
Headquarters highlighting difficulties experienced and areas of concem, 
and 
O the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff tesson Learned Report identifying the 
tessons leamed from Op ASSISTANCE (the codenarne for the Canadian 
Forces' support to the flood of 1997). 
In order to gather additional data in the area of informational and decision-rnaking 
requirements related to the flood of 1997 and to crisis circumstances in general, qualitative 
and open-ended interviews were conducted with senior officialç at ail three levels of 
government, and with other actors in the domain of  emergency management andlor crisis 
decision-making. The selection of candidates was intended to reflect a geographical and 
organizational cross-section of expert views on the subject matter. The following 
participants were interviewed: 
a Executive Coordinators at provincial emergency management organizations 
in Ontario and Alberta, 
a Behavioural Scientists at the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental 
Medicine (2), 
Q the Manager of the Information Coordination Group at Emergency 
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Preparedness Canada (1 ), 
O Senior Operations Officen at Emergency Preparedness Canada (2), 
O a Staff Officer at the Joint Operations Doctrine Branch of National Defence 
Headquarters (1 ), 
CI Operations Officer at a provincial emergency management organization (1 ), 
3 ~ t b  
O Former Emergency Coordinators at various Rural Municipalities, who were 
in place during the 1997 flood (4). 
All interviews were of approximately one hour's duration and were conducted in 
person according to Dexter's 'elite interview" criteria (1 970). In other words, the interviews 
featured the interviewees' definition of reality, and al1 participants were encouraged to 
introduce and explore the issue from their perspective. For most interviews, question 
development was based on the individual being interviewed, but in al1 cases the questions 
focussed on the subject of informational issues in support of decision-making. In the case 
of the interviews conducted with the former Emergency Coordinators, however, the 
questions at Appendix B were used with al1 respondents. 
Interviews were tape recorded to ensure that responses were fully and accurately 
captured and notes were compiled on the basis of the tapes. Time constraints prevented 
the verbatim transcription of the interviews. 
The study involved a literature review that focussed on decision-making theory and 
on the use of information to support better decision-making, especially in crisis situations. 
It also involved drawing on the writer's personal experience as a Canadian Forces 
Communications and Electronics Engineer, as a participant and observer in the domain of 
emergency management over the course of 22 years in the Canadian Forces, as the 
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provincial Dornestic Operations officer from 1995 to 1997, and as a special project officer 
with the Manitoba Ernergency Management Organization from 1998 to 1999. 
The development of the cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency information model in 
support of ernergency management was based on the Stnictured Systems Design and 
Analysis Methodology (SSADM), which provided a frarnework for the analysis of the 
informational problerns, the determination of information requirements, and the preliminary 
architecture of the model. 
Outline 
Chapter one provides a background to the Canadian emergency management 
structure and a discussion of the informational problems this structure experienced during 
the Red River Basin flood of 1997. The background and discussion lead to the thesis 
statement and to a description of the methodology used in the completion of the study. 
Chapter two differentiates normal from crisis decision-making and examines various 
decision-making theories as they pertain to both contexts. Chapter two underscores that 
decision-making, on whatever level and in whatever environment, implies the notion of 
gathenng and evaluating information and concludes that good decisions Row from well- 
designed information systems. 
Chapter three elaborates on this principle and concerns itself with information and 
communication theories in ternis of how these might illuminate crisis decision-making and 
crisis management. Ultimately, it attempts to ascertain the specific information 
requirernents of crisis decision-making and to conceptualize these information requirements 
fiowing through an emergency management structure. 
Chapter four builds a cross-jurisdictional. multi-agency information model which 
addresses the informational problems associated with the management of the 1997 Red 
River basin flood. The model provides a foundation upon which a standard emergency 
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management information system may be designed and implernented for crisis managers 
to better meet the next crisis, irrespective of its nature or its location. 
Chapter five summarizes the main findings of the study, reinforces the conclusion 
that an emergency management infornation system is needed to ensure effective 
coordination of ernergency management activities, and identifies areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 - DECISION MAKING 
Introduction 
Decision-making, on whatever level and in whatever environment, implies the notion 
of gathering and evaluaüng information. This chapter reviews selected literature pertaining 
to decision-making, differentiates non-crisis from crisis decision-making, and examines 
various decision-making theories as they relate to both contexts. 
NonlCrisis Oeclslon-Making - Discussion 
The topic of decision-making in non-crisis circumstances, Le., within the context of 
ordinary affairs, has been the subject of much examination through the years by many 
scholars. Various theories have been presented both to explain the outcomes of decision- 
making in different fields and to assist decision-rnakers with procedures for better decision- 
making. In most cases, these theories deal with decision-making as a systemic process 
with clearly defined elements and in a distinct sequence of steps. In other cases. the 
theories focus on how the wider, underlying political forces interact, how the values of 
decision-makers may change over time, and how the perceptions of the outcomes by the 
participants may Vary. Generally, however, there is agreement in the literature that non- 
crisis decision-making takes place relatively slowly over time in a relatively stable 
environment which contains established goals, noms, and procedures. 
Unfortunately, many examinations of non-crisis decision-making, do not adequately 
broach the condition of a cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency environment. Instead, they 
often presume a single, unified actor (making unilateral decisions, even when the focus is 
on govemments that consist of a variety of organizations, not al1 of which share the same 
goals, perspectives and interests). The unified actor modei does not fit with the changing 
environment of the public sector, which is characterked by rapid change, interdependence, 
the necessity for collaboration. shared authority and influence based upon continuous 
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interaction. However, literature on decision-making is slowly incorporating recognition of 
the complications of these new interconnected realities. 
AIthough non-crisis conditions in the public sector more easily allow for a series of 
well-deliberated and related decisions, decision points1. corrections, and adjustments in the 
course of decision-making, the non-crisis framework may restrict innovation andlor the 
choice of alternatives considered (Simeon. 1976, p. 555). This framework is made up of a 
variety of considerations including the nature of the institutional structure, procedural 
factors, the influence of power. social and cultural attitudes and ideas, professional 
standards, national or regional economic conditions, and anticipated political developments 
(Adie and Thomas. 1987; Graber, 1992). 
Another potentially restricting elernent that might be included in this framework is the 
essential requirement to rnobilize public understanding and support for the outcomes. 
Although these considerations rnight also appear in crisis decision-making situations, they 
are quickly subjugated to a lesser role by the "crisis condition" dictum that "decisions have 
to be made urgently or lives and property are lost" (Auf der Heide. 1989, p. 56). Moreover 
in crisis, people tend to allow their leaders, the decision-makers, more control over their 
lives (Hamblin, 1958). 
Non-Crisis Decision-Making - Models 
In examining non-crisis decision-making, Heath (1 998), Klein (1 998). Rainey (1 997). 
Graber (1 992). Kernaghan and Segal(1991), and Adie and Thomas (1 987) al1 bring certain 
mainstream theories to the fore. namely: 
1 Decision points are points in time when reasonable options exist, which may be 
considered or taken by the decision-rnaker. Even if no other option is consciously considered, as 
long as one was available and was potentially known to the decision-rnaker, a decision is 
considered made (Klein, 1997, p. 16). 
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Comprehensive Rationality, 
Incrementalism, 
Bounded Rationality and Safisficing, 
Mixed Scanning, 
Agçregathn, 
Garbage Can, and 
Public Choice. 
Each one of these theories will be examined briefiy in order to present an 
incorporated perspective of non-crisis decision-making. 
Comorehensive Raüonalitv. The theory of cornprehensive rationality is the most 
widely accepted theory of non-crisis decision-making in govemment (Adie and Thomas, 
1987, p. 199). Its approach uses logical, precise procedures that are characterized by 
clarity of objectives, reliance on information, explicitness of evaluation, a high degree of 
cornprehensiveness of overview, and wherever possible, quantification of values for 
mathematical analysis (Lindblom, 1959). Decisions based on cornprehensive rationality 
involve a multi-step analysis. For example, the target problem is separated from other 
problems or, at least, is subjected to meaningful consideration in cornparison with other 
problems. The consideration of the problem yields goals, values, or objectives which are 
subsequently clarified and ranked according to their importance. Alternatives for dealing 
w'th the problem are examined. Consequences for each alternative are investigated and 
compared. Finally, the correct alternative, Le., the one that is believed to maximize the 
attainment of the goals, values or objectives while minimizing the consequences. is chosen 
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(Anderson, 1984, p. 8). 
Another way of representing the rnulti-step decision-making process associated with 
comprehensive rationality is posited by Klein (1 998, p. 261). His mode1 of comprehensive 
rationality consists, first, of collecting objective information that can be described and 
checked by others. Next, tasks, ideas, arguments, or problems must be decomposed into 
small basic elernents so that different calculations might be performed on them. These 
small basic elements must then be decontextualized from the often too ambiguous big 
picture. The necessary calculations, Le., the range of formal procedures such as deductive 
niles of logic and statistical analysis must be applied to them in order to determine the 
courses of action available from which to choose2. Finally, the whole process of analysis 
and representation must then be open to public scnitiny (Ibid.). 
Advantages to the use of comprehensive rationality in non-crisis decision-making 
circumstances include the reduction of the chance that an important option will be 
overlooked, and the maximization of the chance that the decisions will be reliable, i.e., that 
they will yield the same result each time for the same analysis. It provides the benefits of 
an orderiy, systematic, and quantitative decision-making approach and it provides a general 
strategy that applies in situations where goal agreement and technical knowledge are high. 
Comprehensive rationality supports a broad and vigorous search for many options rather 
than deep searches of only a few, and it allows the decision-maker to use declarative 
knowledge, i.e., knowledge which can be explained. It can be particularly useful in helping 
novice decision-makers determine what they do not know. It also serves well in providing 
highei authority with the evidence it often see ks that alternatives were considered. 
2 Techniques typically used in rational decision-making to help the decision-maker 
make sense out of complicated choices are operations research, statistical decision theory, 
decision trees, cost-benefit analysis, and systems analysis (Klein, 1998; Kernaghan and Siegel, 
1 991 ; Lindblom, 1959). ltalicized ternis are further defined at the Glossary. 
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On the other hand, cornprehensive rationality presents certain disadvantages. One 
of them, according to Klein. is that the small basic elements vital to the process are likely 
to depend on individual goals and methods of calculations and are therefore potentially at 
risk of being identified arbitrarily (1 998, p. 262). Other problems relate to the difficulties of 
using ambiguous rules, setting up the calculations, trying to apply rational methods to a 
large set of factors, and trying to work out the implications of al1 the different combinations 
(1 bid.). 
An even more important limit on rational decision-making in practice is the difficulty 
of ranking goals, values, or objectives in a pluralistic society. As Kernaghan and Siegel 
suggest, the issue becomes: 'Whose goals and whose values should predominate in 
decision-making?" The best technical analysis available. they add. is useless if there is no 
agreement on the answers to these questions (1 991, p. 1 16). Even if there were agreement 
on "whon and "what," the requirement for comprehensive analysis potentially introduces 
severe complications as a result of the theory's stipulation that the decision-maker find and 
compare all potential solutions. Fortunately, because the non-crisis environment is 
somewhat time-tolerant and allows room for correction and adjustment, the limits of 
comprehensive rationality, in that environment, may be of slight consequence. 
Klein suggests that rational thinking is like fovea13 vision, which provides the ability 
to make fine discriminations but is not sufficient alone to maintain orientation and is 
irrelevant during in the dark. Similarly, rationality lets decision-makers make fine 
discriminations between ideas. However, the decision-maker needs peripheral vision to 
detect where to apply the analysis and calculations (1 998, pp. 260-1). 
3 The fovea is a small depression in the retina at the back of the eye. This is the 
area of the greatest acuity. 
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Comprehensive rationality poorly serves the decision-maker who is lacking al1 the 
information required, who is unsure how to do the ratings, who disagrees with the weights, 
or who runs out of time before a decision can be made. The assumptions of comprehensive 
rationality are indeed restrictive. Irrespective of cnsis or noncrisis conditions, rarely is there 
the time or the information needed to make this type of appraoch work. Although 
comprehensive rationality may play a dominant role in a few decision-making situations, it 
is more likely that its role in most decision-making situations is limited at best. Adie and 
Thomas suggest that comprehensive rationality as a decision-making technique is not 
applied very easily in practice (1 987, pp. 200-202). 
Lindblom (1959) echoes the concems raised above and adds that for complex 
problems, rational decision-making is impossible. Rational decision-making is overly 
dependant on intellectual capacities, sources of information. time, and money. al1 of which 
are in short supply. Although decision-makers may strive for rationality, cognitive limits, lack 
of information, t h e  limits, and other uncertainties force them to adopt another way of 
thinking their decisions throug h. One alternative is for decision-makers to ma ke choices 
andlor change the policies incrementally by way of successive limited comparisons between 
the status quo and other nearby alternatives. Another is to undertake a limited or bounded 
search among options and choose the most satisfactory one afier as much consideration 
as can be managed within the constraints imposed by the situation. These approaches 
involve ascertaining the preferences of interested groups, calculating how the various 
alternatives benefit or ham these groups, balancing diverse political interests, and 
ultimately negotiating with representatives of conflicting interests (Graber 1992). 
Incrementalism. The theory of incrementalisrn, or the method of successive limited 
compansons, atternpts to answer some of the dificulties identified with rational decision- 
making theory. Realism, intuition. economy of information, relevance, flexibility, resilience, 
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and loose structure characterize incrementalism, according to Adie and Thomas (1 987, p. 
203). Moreover, incremental decision-making is exploratory in the sense that goals and 
means are adjusted in the light of experience, and it is continuous in the sense that there 
is no single decision or right solution to a problem4 (Kemaghan and Siegel, 1991; Lindblom, 
1959). 
Adie and Thomas lista number of incrementalist strategies to cope with complexity 
(1987, p. 203). These include simplifying the problem through omission; satisficing by 
adopting policies that will satisfy the demands being made and suffice for the present; 
adopting a remedial approach that seeks workable solutions to eliminate known andior 
limited social ills rather than to produce best solutions towards some desired, future state 
of affairs; making use of feedback loops by deliberately making decisions that leave open 
the possibility of doing better the next time; and making use of bottlenecks to create more 
tirne to clarify problems and whether or not to make a decision at ail. lncremental decision- 
making should make it easier for one group to anticipate the kind of moves another rnight 
make, and easier to make corrections so as to avoid serious lasting mistakes (Lindblom, 
1959, p. 27). 
However, a variety of criticisms of incrernentalism are also present in the literature. 
Lindblom (1959) himself alludes to the lack of a built-in safeguard for al1 relevant values, 
which may lead decision-makers to overiook excellent policies for no other reason than that 
they are not suggested by the chain of successive policy steps leading up to the present. 
lncrementalism is too conservative in its approach and it does not take account of major 
4 The better decision, however, is likely the one upon which political agreement is 
found (Adie and Thomas, 1987). 
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social innovations, nor does it sufficiently differentiate between fundamenta15, incrementav, 
or routinelprocedura17 decision-making approaches (Ehioni, 1967). Rather, it mistakes 
routine decision-making for al1 decision-making and does not include those situations when 
decision-makers are prepared to expend the costs in ternis of time, personnel, and effort 
in order to make more fundarnental decisions, Le., more radical changes to policy. It also 
ignores the fact that power is unequally distributed within society. By stressing that the best 
decision is often the one on which political agreement can be found, the incrementalist 
accepts that privileged and well-organized groups have the advantage. 
Dror provides yet another critical view of incrementalism by stating that, for it to 
work, extant policies must be basically satisfactory so that marginal change is al1 that is 
necessary in order to achieve desired results (1988). If the existing policy is flawed, 
s Fundamental decisions are significant departures from approaches previously 
taken in policy areas, and involve higher degrees of uncertainty and complexity. As a rule, far 
more resources must be devoted to anticipating possible outcomes from fundarnental decisions. 
Moreover, more information is necessary, not only to obtain support to make and implement a 
fundamental decision, but also to plan and persuade (Lindquist, 1988, pp. 101 -2). 
6 lncremental decisions tend to be reactive and remedial in nature. The makers of 
incremental decisions are rarely interested in redesigning policies from top to bottom, and instead 
tend to make marginal changes to prevailing policies. Moreover, incrernental deviations from the 
status quo are more likely to be found acceptable by decision-makers because outcomes are 
easier to predict; more is known about current practice than radical proposais. Limited policy 
changes are also attractive because social problems are rarely solved; decision makers realize 
they will inevitably confront the sarne problems in the future; and incremental changes are easier 
to justify and to gain support for, in political terms. It follows, that decision-makers have 
incentives to consider problerns successively and in isolations from other problerns, so that they 
c m  produce temporary solutions and move on to the next probtern (Lindquist, 1988, p. 99). 
7 Routine decision-making occurs when a formal, pre-existing, long term 
consensus is in place regarding the nature of the courses of action available. Very littie deviation 
from the ordinary is ever anticipated under this category of decision-making. Routine decision 
systems are designed and intended to anticipate and respond to problems that may anse in 
program performance or environmental conditions. Responding to problems under the category 
of routine/proceduraf decision-making are often reduced to checking standard operating 
procedures or some other such anticipatory guidelines. However, routine does not preclude 
decision-making. Rather, decisions establish procedure, trigger particular programs, and identify 
and solve problems that were not [originally or previously] anticipated by routines" (Lindquist, 
1998, pp. 964). 
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incremental change is futile. Likewise, incrementalism is inappropriate when radical change 
is called for (lbid.). lncremental decision-making lends itself only to problems which remain 
more or less constant and which are disposed to incremental change. The most obvious 
difficulty on this point occurs when a problem arises and must be resolved, but there simply 
are no previouç conditions upon which to make incrernental changes. In order for 
incrementalisrn to be relevant, there must be strong continuity in the available means for 
coping with problems. For example, faced with new problem-solving methods, technology, 
or knowledge, decision-makers would be hard pressed to make an incremental change at 
the outset (Adie and Thomas, 1987, p. 202). It follows that in the face of cnsis conditions. 
the decision-maker is justified in seeking a better decision-making routine. 
Mixed Scanninq. As an alternative, or rather as a modification, to the incrernental 
approach to decision-making, Etzioni calls for a hybrid approach that combines rationality 
and incrementalism wherein a scanning of alternatives is rnixed, in the sense that only a few 
aspects of a problem and only a few alternatives are selected for intensive analysis (1 967). 
This fundamental review process would occur when faced with rapid change, when unusual 
circurnstances occur, or when there has been prolonged neglect or mistaken treatment of 
a problem (Kernaghan and Siegel. 1991; Adie and Thomas, 1987). 
Etzioni's mixed scanning theory of decision-making provides a reminder that 
decision-making within govemment typically varies in scope and magnitude and that the 
approach taken must be appropriate with the level at which the decisions are being made. 
For example, mundane, incremental decision-making may predominate the lower levels of 
bureaucracy. However, more enwmpassing scanning of alternatives may be prevalent at 
higher levels. Mixed scanning seems to provide for greater theoretical recognition of those 
occasions when bold, forthright policies are called for and are possible (Adie and Thomas, 
1987, p. 205). Although this decision-making technique realizes some economy of time and 
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information by not having to review al1 possible courses of action, the maintenance of the 
'intensive analysisn requirement may preclude its effective use in crisis circumstances. 
Aaaregation. Graber describes an aggregative model of noncrisis decision-making 
wherein the decision-making process involves a combination of information, advice, and 
options drawn from many groups, intemal as well as extemal (1 992, p. 127). These groups 
are brought together to develop various alternatives and to vote for the option they prefer. 
The final choice, then, represents an aggregation of individual preferences rather than the 
negotiated outcome of incremental decision-making. Although the aggregative process may 
be good for generating ideas, Graber wams that it may be unrealistic because it tends to 
ignore political interests, agendas, and power relationships among the participants (Ibid.). 
The Garbaae Can. March and Olsen offer a non-crisis decision-making model that 
involves drifting into decisions without a well-planned search for relevant information and 
without making explicit choices (1 979, p.26). In this garbage-can model, various options 
are discussed, but more as a way to debate goals than to reach a decision. They contend 
that the more deliberative decision-making models are, the more unrealistic they are. In 
most decisions, they argue, problems are not fully understood, goals are not clear, and 
interpersonal relationships are unpredictable. In their view, solutions are generated 
haphazardly, and final decisions emerge only from the interplay of a garbage-can collection 
of disparate ideas, judgements, and non-decisions. Viewed in this way, attempts to gather 
information that is relevant to a decision are mostly window dressing and are, even if 
sincere, futile (Graber, 1992, p. 128). 
Public Choice. Public choice, another model of non-crisis decision-making, aims to 
explain collective decisions in terms of self-serving behaviour in decision makers, whether 
individuals, politicians, or bureaucrats. It also serves to explain the interactions between 
these groups. However, this model of decision-making leads to strongly stated propositions 
Page 2-1 0 
about what decision-rnakers would be expected to do in a given set of circumstances. The 
difficulty in determining the value of public choice decision-making is that courses of action 
are presumed to be based on the particular decision-making group's motivations, which are 
typically subjective (Kemaghan and Siegel. 1991, pp. 120-122). 
Non-Crisis Decision-Mâking - Analysis 
An lncomorated Pers~ective. Non-crisis decision-making, irrespective of the 
approach or theoretical conceptualization, entails four major phases, each requiring the 
gathering and processing different strands of information. The first phase involves problem 
analysis, the second yields various options to cope with the problem and their exploration, 
the third speaks to the selection of a course of action, and the fourth phase entails 
monitoring the consequences of the decision and generating feedback about changes that 
might be required. 
Analvsino the Problem. Since assembling al1 the facts is invariably impractical. 
satisficing is a viable alternative that allows fact-finding to stop when a reasonably 
satisfactory solution has corne into view. However, because the facts of a particular 
situation are frequently unclear, decision-makers, in an attempt to cope with this fog, rnay 
delay their appraisal until more information is available, or they rnay decide to take no action 
at all. Altematively, they rnay draw on institutional mernories for analogous events of the 
past and on the insights gained in coping with them. Relying on past institutional 
experiences, however, rnay pose certain ri&. For example, contextual changes, which 
rnay falsify analogies, rnay be overlooked. Likewise, too much stock rnay be placed on 
Iessons leamed from events that have only occurred once or twice before. Additional 
relevant information and suggestions must, therefore, be sought from as broad a spectrurn 
of infonnants as time and resources will allow (Graber. 1992, pp. 11 9-1 20). 
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Decision-makers, unfortunately, are often constrained in their information gathering 
by authorizing legislation, intemal inflexibility and inadequate information systerns, political 
considerations, or psychological characteristics. Moreover, they may often feel compelled 
to tap only the sources that are likely to support the goals of the institution's leadership and 
the authorities on which the institution depends. At best, such constraints are apt to 
severely discourage innovative approaches to various situations and rnay limit effective 
decision-making (1 bid.). 
Explonna the Options. Decision-makers must have enough information about their 
institutional interna1 environment, the external environment in which the situation is 
developing, the activities of other public and pnvate actors, as well as certain aspects of the 
political culture, to be able to judge the kinds of decisions that can or should be 
implemented. Coordination of various approaches to the problem may become consuming, 
as might the process of determining whether to invoke a decision to retain the status quo. 
lrnplementing small incremental change iç generally easier than opting to make a major or 
radical change in direction (Ibid., p. 121). 
The exploration of options in the public decision-making arena must also involve 
consideration of public scnitiny and media attention. Although not intended as a 
determinant in decision-making, it is essential to be aware of the perceptions and 
acceptability of the van'ous options and of the possible reactions from interested extemal 
groups. Solutions that mn counter to the preferences and wants of those affected by them 
are more difficult to implement. Disappointed groups must be rnollified by acceptable 
explanations or appeased in other ways. For acceptable explanations to be presented, the 
consequences of the choices under consideration must be considered even though this 
process may lead to controvenies among decision-makers that can threaten the necessary 
institutional consensus (Ibid.). 
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Selecting the Course of Action. This phase brings the scientific principles and 
theoretical concepts and models descnbed earlier into play, Le., comprehensive rationality, 
incrernentalism, bounded rationality and satisficing, mixed scanning, aggregation, garbage 
can, and public choice. Graber posits that. depending on the circumstances, these diffenng 
decision-making routines may be used singly or in combination (1992, p. 122). Pinfield 
sees decision-making as a mixture of rational and anarchic processes (1986, p. 382). 
Whenever goals and procedures are clear and uncontested, decision-making moves in 
rational steps from problem recognition to resolution. Otheiwise, the process may tend 
towards anarchy8 (i.e., doing things solely because the decision-maker said so). The critical 
factor in detemining which process prevails is the clarity and acceptability of goals, and the 
steps to reach them, 
Feedback. Once the decision is made and implemented it is important to monitor 
the consequences so that adjustments can be made, if necessary. Decision-making in 
general and feedback in particular are learning processes through which govemment gains 
knowledge of the environment in which it operates and develops the ability to make sound 
decisions (Graber, 1 992, p. 1 31 ). 
Ctisis Decision-Making - Discussion 
Although the ternis 'crisis," 'disaster," 'catastrophe," and 'ernergency" are al1 often 
used interchangeably in the general literature, the term "crisisn predorninates in the 
decision-making literature. Therefore. for the purposes of the immediate discussion, 'crisisn 
8 It is possible that Pinfield here is trying to elaborate on the concept of "intuition." 
Beach and Mitchell also present a contingency model of decision-making, arguing that the type of 
strategy a decision-maker uses changes depending on the context of the decision task - using 
rigorous analytical methods here, and non-analyücal methods there. In explaining non-anaiytical 
methods they suggest ternis Iike "gut feeling," tossing a coin, and 'eeney meey miney moe" 
(Beach and Mitchell, 1978, pp. 439-449). Klein argues that what Beach and Mitchell are really 
trying to describe is intuition (Klein, 1998, p. 34.). Intuition is covered under its own heading 
below. 
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will be used exclusively. 
What is a cnsis? To some, a crisis may represent an event involving a loss or a 
potential loss of some treasured thing, whether it is as simple and personal as a wallet or 
as complex and intangible as a social program. Regardless of the perspective, whether 
individual, social, psychological. physical, political or econornic. a crisis seemingly ernerges 
from nowhere, takes the victim(s) by surprise, challenges normality and order. and has a 
substantial consequence. In the context of this chapter, however, a crisis is better 
represented by the following definitions and descriptions: 
O Fritz defines a crisis as 'an event, located in time and space, in which a 
community undergoes severe danger and incurs losses such that the social 
structure is disrupted and the furfilment of al1 or sorne of its essential 
functions is prevented" (Dynes, IWO, p.78). 
fl The Canadian Privy Council Office formally defines a crisis as "a petiod of 
danger for the [cornmunity], resulting from a natural or man-made mishap, 
debacle, or disaster. [It] need not pose a serious threat to human life, but 
it must somehow challenge the public sense of appropriateness, tradition 
or values, safety or security in a way that threatens the integrity of the 
[comrnunity]" (Environment Canada, 1991, p. 44). 
O Rosenthal, Hart, and Charles describe crises as having three main 
features: a severe threat, an urgent need to make decisions, and a great 
deal of uncertainty (1989, p.10). They further characterize a crisis as 
involving extreme collective stress compounded by overloaded 
communication channels, incomplete information and consequent rumour 
spreading, an inundation of outside assistance including volunteers, 
emergency personnel, and media, an irrational aversion of the affected 
population to the relief effort. and immediate allegations conceming who is 
to be blarned, and who is taking advantage of the emergency situation 
(Ibid., 1989, p.16). 
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P The US Federal Emergency Management Agency views a crisis as an 
occurrence of a severity and magnitude nomally associated with death, 
injury, and property damage, which requires extraordinary procedures, 
resources, and support from govemment. A crisis uçually develops 
suddenly and unexpectedly and demands immediate, coordinated, and 
effective response by multiple government and private sector organization 
to meet human needs and to facilitate speedy recovery (Auf der Heide, 
1989, p.51). 
Drawing upon these sources, crises have a number of characteristics They can 
happen with little or no waming, anywhere, anytime. The circumstances surrounding their 
occurrence are inevitably rife with uncertainty; pose a threat to a community's social. 
physical, political, economic, organizational, and natural environments; and demand the 
making of fast, critical decisions by senior officiais and practitioners of emergency 
management. All crisis response activity is conducted under intense time pressure, is 
subject to expast facto public scrutiny, and is organizationally draining in terms of physical, 
financial, and human resources. 
What is Crisis Manaaement? Public officiais and practitionen of emergency 
management jointly practise 'crisis managemenr in order that some order or nonalcy to 
a disaster-affected community can be regained as quickly as possible. To prornote a better 
understanding of 'crisis management," the following fragmented definitions and descriptions 
are provided. Crisis management involves: 
Ci the process of developing and implernenting policies and programs to 
[rnitigate] and to cope with the risks associated with natural and man-made 
hazards (Cigler, 1988, p.3,  
the discipline and profession of applying science, technology, and 
management functions to deal with extreme events that can injure or kill 
large numbers of people, do extensive darnage to property, and disrupt 
community Iife (Drabek and Hoetrner, 1991, Introduction), 
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in relation to potential or real emergencies, any measure that plans in 
advance, any measure that reduces the risk and uncertainly and allows for 
more outcome control (Heath, 1998, p. 12), 
a collection of anticipatory measures that enable a [comrnunity] to 
coordinate and control its responses to an ernergency (Nudell and Antokol, 
1988, p.20), 
a process that requires planning, coordinating, communicating, and 
decision-making (Auf der Heide, 1989; Charles and Kim, 1988; Cigler, 
1988; Cornfort, 1988; Drabek and Hoetmer, 1991 ; Fink, 1986; Quarantelli, 
1985; Rosenthal, et al., 1989; Sylves and Waugh, 1990), and 
the process of retuming a [crisis-affected comrnunity] to near-normal daily 
activity (Govemment of Canada, n.d.). 
"Crisis managementn may indeed be taken to imply pre-crisis activities such as 
taking preparatory action. However, it is on those aspects of 'crisis managernerf that 
relate specifically to the on-spot and real-time activities of communicating and decision- 
making that this discussion will focus. Although the theoretical basis of non-crisis decision- 
making may, in principle, be applied to crisis decision-making, crisis characteristics such 
as time compression, threat to life and property, stress, and novelty preclude nonîrisis 
decision-making approaches in crisis. 
Crisis Decision-Making vs. Non-CrIsis Decision-Making 
In a crisis, decision-making is, more often than not, a transversal exercise, crossing 
many jurisdictions and many agencies. It is typically more pragmatic, concentrating on what 
must be accomplished regardless of procedural or legal limitations (Warheit and Dynes, 
1969, p. 13). Because of the high intensity environment surrounding crisis management 
and specifically because of the potential risk to [ives and property, the context in which 
decisions are made emphasizes urgency and vigilance (Fink, 1986; Auf der Heide, 1989; 
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Janis, 1989). Information requirements increase exponentially. Indeed, as the problems 
relating to a crisis become more complex, ambiguous, and unstable, more meaningful 
information is required to resolve uncertainties and to effect decision-making (Graber. 
1 992). 
Non-crisis decision research involves the study of decision-making as a discrete 
process, Le., one that is based on comprehensive rationality and that can be separated from 
the context and examined norrnatively. In contrast, the study of cnsis decision-making is 
based on actual decision-making behaviour and on cognitive-based models of decision 
strategies. (Rasmussen, 1997). Decision-making in crisis finds the traditional normative 
models unsatisfactory (Klein, et al., 1 993). 
Crisis decision-making implies the goal of containing and reducing a crisis, as it is 
defined at the outset of this chapter, to status quo ante. The more crises are prevalent or 
fateful, the more good crisis decision-making becomes essential. Moreover, because 
important and largely irreversible decisions may be taken dunng crises, it is vital that the 
processes of decision-making and policy-making be converged and fully integrated (Dror, 
1988, p. 181). In other words, those who make the decisions should not subsequently have 
to convince or seil the policy-makers on the chosen course, running the risk that failure 
might cause having to go 'back to the drawing board." Convergence and integration of 
decision-making and policy-making have the added benefit of not being allowing the finger 
to be pointed at either the decision-maker or the policy-maker - they are one and the same. 
Behavioural and prescriptive studies of crisis decision-making, including the 
psychology of individuals and groups under stress, are pervasive. However, the trouble 
9 However, as cautioned by Auf der Heide (1989), Dynes (1970), and Scanlon 
(1 970), it is important that convergence in other areas such as personnel, material resources, 
and especially, information be avoided. Convergence in these areas, they explain, may lead to 
information overload and be difficult to disentangle. 
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with most earlier studies was that their authors had never participated in a real high- 
intensity, cnsis decision-making incident (Dror, 1988, p. 182). Almost as if in response to 
this, a crisis decision-making research discipline, otherwise known as the Naturalistic 
Decision-Making (NDM) movernent, was initiatedlO. 
The study of NDM concems itself with how crisis managers use their individual 
experience to make decisions in field settings, how they handle al1 of the typical confusions 
and pressures of the crisis environment, such as uncertain, ambiguous andlor missing 
information; time constraints; ill-defined, shifting andlor conflicting goals; and dynamic and 
continually changing conditions (Klein, 1998. p. 1). NDM researchers are also interested 
in how decision-making takes place in an environment which is characterized by cross- 
jurisdiction and multi-agency constraints, ill-structured tas ks, high stakes, and team 
interaction (Flin, et al.. 1997. p. 1). Indeed. the NDM environment is charged with 
extraordinary exigencies. The real-time reaction of crisis managers to the unique conditions 
of crises and their capacity to act in spite of a maelstrom of activity and emotion set crisis 
decision-ma king apart frorn non-crisis decision-making . 
Work in NDM is progressed by practical problems as opposed to hypothesis testing. 
which is typically associated with non-crisis decision-making theory, and is driven by 
curiosity about how cnsis managers make decisions under the extremely stressful settings 
rnarked by a crisis environment. The study of NDM addresses those areas not specifically 
dealt with by non-crisis decision-making theories. For example, NDM research focuses on 
tasks with multiple event feedback loops, concentrates on decisions where multiple crisis 
'O The NDM movernent was initiated in 1989 in answer to a growing interest by 
basic and applied researchers in the generalizability of many research findings outside the 
laboratory setting. What the NDM frarnework offers is more than just a critique of traditional 
approaches. It offers a different set of rnodels and methods along with a different approach to 
supporting [crisis] decision-rnaking through training and design (Klein, 1997). 
Page 2-18 
playen are involved, concerns itself with the impact of stress on decision-making, and 
relates well to cognitive research and processes. 
In contrast to the typical sources of power" found in non-crisis decision-making, ie. ,  
deductive logical thinking. analysis of probabilities, and statistical methods, those in crisis 
decision-making lean towards intuition, mental simulation, metaphors and analogies, and 
story-telling (Klein, 1998). 
Intuition. Intuition is the t e m  used by crisis decision makers and practitioners of 
crisis management to define their "sense of knowing." Its use is usually characterized by 
a feeling that something is not 'right." expectations are not being met, or there is a 
mismatch or anomaly in the situation. However, in the context of the study of crisis 
decision-making, intuition is more properly defined as the ability to recognize key patterns 
and deviations from the familiar and prototypical in order to deduce the dynarnics of a 
situation. One reason decision makers and practitioners often cannot describe what they 
have noticed or exactly how they judged whether the situation was typical or atypical is 
because of the subtleness of these patterns and deviations. Another reason is that the 
decision maker or practitioner is reacting to things that are not happening rather than to 
things that are (Klein. 1998, pp. 31-34). 
While some rnay believe intuition to be an inborn trait, there is no evidence showing 
that some are blessed with it and others are not (Ibid., p. 33). Intuition is dependent on the 
use of experience. Dependency on experience is the sine qua non of the unconscious 
ability to recognize things without knowing how the recognizing is accomplished (Ibid.). 
Otherwise said, experience unconsciously affects the way decision-makers see the 
I t  Klein defines sources of power as the analytical abilities of breaking a problem 
down into elernents and performing basic operations on these elements as a way of solving a 
pro blem (1 998, notes). 
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situation. The power of intuition enables the crisis manager to size up a situation quickly 
and immediately, as well as to detemine how to proceed, which goals to pursue, what to 
expect, and how to respond. Described in this way, intuition does not sound very 
mysterious. 
Mental Simulation. Mental simulation can be related to imagination, i.e., the ability 
to imagine people and objects consciously and to transform those people and objects 
through several transitions, finally picturing them in a different way than at the start (Klein, 
1998, pp. 3, 45-74). It is central to crisis decision-making routines because it constitutes 
the power that lets cn'sis managers play out and observe how a course of action might be 
carried out, It allows skilful decision-making and problem resolution under conditions where 
non-cnsis decision making does not work. It helps explain the cues and information 
received so that the situation may be better interpreted and problems better diagnosed. It 
helps generate expectancies by pmviding a preview of events as they might unfold and by 
letting a course of action be run through mentally in aid of preparation. By allowing a search 
of pitfalls, it also enables a decision to be made whether or not to adopt the course of action 
under consideration (Klein, 1998, pp. 45-74). 
Mental simulation offers an alternative to non-crisis decision-making analytical 
strategies and models which are largely ineffective in crisis situations (Ibid.). For example, 
in cornparison to the standard comprehensive rationality model (identify the set of options, 
identify the ways of evaluating these options, weigh each option, conduct a rating, select 
the option with the highest score as the course of action), the mental simulation model has 
the crisis manager per fon an identification of the situational needs in which past events 
are explained and future events are projected; specify the parameters of the situation, 
including the initial state, the terminal state, and causal factors; assemble the action 
sequence; and perforrn an intemal evaluation for coherence, applicability, and 
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completeness. If the mental simulation is acceptable, the action sequence can be nin, if 
not the process would begin anew (Ibid.). 
However, on the down side, the ability to use mental simulation depends on having 
the knowledge-base and experience to set up the mental simulations in the first place. 
Moreover, mental simulation takes effort to effect, particularly under stress and fatigue, and 
can be very complicated when the situation intensifies. The more serious drawback is that 
the crisis manager, left unchecked. can imagine any contradictory evidence away (Ibid.). 
Metaphors and AnaIooues. These language devices allow the crisis manager to 
draw on experience by suggesting parallels between the current situation and something 
else previously encountered. They direct crisis decision-rnakers' thinking by framing 
situation awareness, by identifying appropriate goals, and by flagging relevant pieces of 
information. Analogues, for example, provide a structure for making predictions when there 
are many unknown factors. They function like experiments, linking interactive sets of 
causes to outcomes. By taking into account the difference between the analogue and the 
current case, crisis decision-rnakers can adjust the analogous data to derive a prediction. 
Analogical predictions are most helpful when there is a good database but not enough 
information to apply a more rigorous analysis. Analogues are also useful in generating 
expectancies and solving problems (Klein, 1998, pp. 197-21 3). 
Crisis Decision-Making - Models 
NDM researchers, such as Flin, et al. (1997). tend to view the process of crisis 
decision-making as a function of four interdependent aspects - namely, the quality of the 
decision problem or the characteristics of the decision situation; the ability of the decision- 
maker to cope with the problems of the situation; the extent of the cnsis manager's 
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experience-base and knowledge; and the complexity of the coordinating structurel2. NDM 
researchers, such as Orasnau (1997), focus on the cognitive processes and requirement 
involved in crisis decision-making and further wtegorize ctisis solutions and decisions in 
tems of four models (each of which will be examined below): 
Q Ruled-Based Decision-Making, 
CI Choice Driven ûecision-Making, 
a Creative Decision-Making, and 
O Recognition-Primed Decision-Making. 
Rule-Based Decision-Makinq. Orasnau (lbid.) describes nile-based decision-making 
as conceptually the simplest decision-making model, particularly when a condition matches 
a component of a condition-action rule, which should trigger retrieval of the appropriate 
response from long-terni memory. Reflex-like, or fully integrated habitua1 behaviour, she 
suggests, tends to be resistant to interference from stress or^'^. On the negative side, crisis 
decision-makers who uts the rule-based approach may tend towards delivering inflexible 
'book" decisions that can be wrong in a given set of circumstances. Nevertheless. this 
approach may be acceptable when applied by flexible, eamest. and experienced 
practitionen. However, the use of these approaches by average people with limited 
12 Alt!!ough it is outside the scope of the paper to provide a detailed description of 
the coordinating structures used in support of crisis management, it suffices to mention that there 
are no less than three typical configurations: the Incident Command System (ICS), the Command 
and Control (C2) system (see Chapter one), and the Emergency Site Manager (ESM) system. 
ltalicized tems are further defined at the Glossary. 
13 Decisions that fali into this RPD category rnay be of the 'GO - NO GOw types of 
responses, in which two very clear and opposing actions are associated with diflerent conditions 
or in which a single action follows from a single condition. RPD decisions/responses are highly 
prescnbed and proceduralized to eliminate the need to think about what to do in high-risk time- 
limited situations (Orasnau, 1997). 
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experience, who would potentially apply only half-understood principles in a crisis situation, 
could end up complicating rather than alleviating the crisis conditions (Heath, 1998, p. 220). 
Choice-Driven Decision-Makinq. Choicxiriven decisions, as described by Orasnau, 
are more complex than rule-based ones and are invoked when there is no rule guiding the 
course of action. There may, however, exist default or favoured responses. Nevertheless, 
the cognitive processes that are involved in choice-driven decisions place greater demands 
on working memory than they do in the rule-based schema. For example, choice-driven 
decision-making options will be assessed against constraints and considerations retrieved 
from memory. This approach may be vulnerable to stressors and may falter when several 
constraints compete or when no ideal solution exists (1 997). 
Creative Decision-Makinq. Creative decision-making is needed when no response 
is retrievable from mernory or standard procedures, no guidance is available, and no 
training previously received is applicable. In these cases, a candidate solution must be 
invented to meet the immediate goals. Subsequent evaluation can only be conducted in 
light of existing constraints (1 bid.). 
Recoonition-Primed Decision-Makinq [RPD). RPD describes the decision strategy 
used most frequently by crisis managers with experience. It explains how they use their 
experience to make difficult decisions without recourse to comprehensive rationality (Klein, 
1998). It can be thought of as a fusion of the 'intuition* and 'mental simulation" models. It 
allows crisis decision-makers to quickly size up the situation, to recognize which course of 
action makes the most sense. and to rapidly evaluate the course of action through 
imagination. Klein identifies three variations of the RPD model (1998). 
In the basic variant (if known situation, then known action), the experienced crisis 
decision-makers recognize the situation as typical or familiar and undentands, by intuition, 
what types of goals make sense. Consequently, priorities are set. Then, by mental 
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simulation, crisis decision-maken examine how the events have been evolving so far and 
postulates how they will continue to evolve. This process yields an estimate of what can 
be expected next. Typical action is identified, and the course of action is implemented. By 
checking whether the expectancies are satisfied. crisis decision-rnakers can judge the 
adequacy of the mental simulation". The processes involved in the basic variant usually 
happen so quickly and automatically that crisis decision-makers may not even be aware of 
it. The important feature of the basic variant. which is also key to the remaining two 
variants is that the recognition process involves sub-processes or by-products - namely, 
understanding plausible goals, understanding relevant cues, identifying typical action, and 
evaluating expectancies. 
Klein's second variant of the RPD mode1 (if unknown situation, work out until known, 
then known action) accounts for a more complex situation with potential errors and 
demands more attention by crisis decision-rnakers (Ibid.). When faced with an unknown 
situation, crisis decision-makers will be unable to recognize it as being either typical or 
unique. Either Information does not clearly match a typical case. or it maps ont0 more than 
one typical case. In this variant, crisis decision-makers must further diagnose (by pattern 
matching or story-telling) the situation in order to recognize it and will likely require more 
information. Another potential error presented by this variant involves an expectancy 
violation, which forces crisis decision-makers to reconsider their initial interpretation of the 
situation. 
ln the last variant (if known situation, known action fails, then reevaluafe known 
actions until correct choice found), Klein forces the rejection of a course of action, which in 
14 The greater the violation, Le., the less expectancies are satisfied, and the more 
effort it takes to explain away conflicting evidence, the less confident crisis decision-makers will 
feel about the mental simulation and diagnosis. 
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tum forces crisis decision-rnakers to re-visualize the action and to redo the estimate in order 
to choose the correct course of action (Ibid.). This process encourages either a satisficing 
approach or a successive limited comparison approach to resolving this condition. 
Irrespective of the variant, the RPD model of crisis decision-making is a means with 
which cnsis managers can use experience to react expeditiously and make good decisions, 
often without having to evîluate any options. Generally, the RPD process, as appl i~d by 
experienced crisis decision-makers, responds well to those features that characterize crisis 
decision-making situations, particularly tirne pressure, high stakes, inadequate information, 
ill-defined goals, poorly defined procedures, cue learning, and dynamic conditions. It does 
not, however. account for teams, organizations, or issues of managing workload and 
attention, nor does it fully describe the strategies available to crisis decision-makers when, 
even if rarely, they do have to compare options in crisis situations. 
Crisis Decision-Making - Analysis 
An Incomorated Perspective. The intent of the foregoing discussion and the 
examination of prevailing crisis decision-making models serves to underscore the 
differences between crisis decision-making and non-crisis decision-making and to promote 
a better understanding of the constraints of time, uncertainty, and consequence on 
decision-making in crisis situations. Crisis decision-making is not an alternative to non- 
crisis decision-making, nor does it offer a 'best wayn to effect choices. It does, however, 
demand that decision-makers possess a certain level of expenence in order that decisions 
can be made in spite of the noise'' surrounding crisis circumstances while there is still a 
15 Noise includes the interference due to environmental conditions as well as 
distractions and competing sounds of other transmissions. Interference can either originate from 
human-based communication barriers, e.g., different languages, different perceptions and 
meanings assigned to words, different beliefs and psychological orientations, or from degradation 
of communication systerns due to obstructions by physical materials. Barriers and noise also 
include background commotion (machinery, voices, alams and static), as well as intrusive 
thoughts and states of physical sensation (Klein, 1998, pp. 114-5). Graber adds that confiicting 
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requirement to make them. But experience alone does not assure satisfactory outcornes, 
decision-makers must also be aware of the inhibitors they face. 
Crisis Decision-Making Inhibiton. Many factors inhibit crisis decision-making, 
especially if they are left unchecked. It is, therefore, vital that decision-maken understand 
thern and endeavour to rninimize their effect. The inhibitors include: 
self-imposition or self-indulgence (Rosenthal, et al.. 1989). 
undue simplification of the problem (Dror, 1989). 
rejecüon of views and evidence not in agreement with existing 
bias(es)(Heath. 1 %8), 
jumping to unjustified conciusions (Assefa and Wahrhaftig, l989), 
wrong size andlor composition of the decision-making group (Graber, 
1 WZ), 
wishful thinking conceming adopted options (Dror, 1989), 
locking on decisions, in spite of negative feedback (lbid.), 
substitution of group solidarity for achievement of task as group goals 
(1 bid.), 
shifts in risk propensities (Ibid.), 
fatigue phenomena (Ibid.), 
insidious swings between euphoria and depression (Ibid.), 
or unrelated messages in the transmission channels may interfere with the transmission and 
effects of desired messages and that these impairments or interferences are also referred to as 
noise (1 992, p. 6). Italicized terms are further defined at the Glossary. 
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a rack of customdesign processes (Ibid.), 
reluctance to 'thin k on the unthinka ble" (Ibid.), 
scarcity of suitable methods and skilled practitioners (Ibid.), 
psychological reactions leading to decision distraction or freezing (Ibid.), 
overwhelming of reason by emotions and pressures (Heath, 1998). 
vagabonging (flitting or butterfiying from goal to goal) (Ibid.), 
encystment or bolstering (focussing on one goal or decision at the expense 
of others) (Ibid.), 
relying exclusively on conventional wisdom, book answers, and lessons 
leamed from previous events (Ibid.), 
refusal (not making any decision) (Ibid.), 
group mindsets (being afraid to oppose a course of action, or supporting a 
choice of one or more senior members out of respect for authority) (Janis, 
1989), 
overconfidence (Heath, 1 998), and 
euphoric acceptance of the illusions of unanimity or of being right and 
invulnerable (Ibid.). 
Although studies on decision-making in crisis situations provide some important 
tentative and suggestive findings on enor pmpensities and incapacities, Dror supports the 
notion that the research in areas related to the above "kitchen lisr of inhibitors is quite 
neglected. He goes on to daim that these inhibitors are hardly accessible by the methods 
under w hich decis ion-making research is often based. Actual quality deficits of crisis 
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decision-making are, ha suspects, very high, and they will remain so unless determined and 
sophisticated countermeasures are taken (1 988, p. 183). 
Main improvement proposals include, but should not be limited to, training and 
exercising crisis decision-making units, conducting simulations, open-ended contingency 
planning, and the inclusion of decision psychological advisors in crisis decision-making 
staffs (lbid.). Unfortunately. when such improvements are considered, additional 
improvement-inhibiting forces corne to the fore. For instance, as rnentioned earlier, in 
important crises, senior public officiais fulfill dominant roles. and their participation in training 
and preparatory exercises in crisis decision-making should. as a result, be a given. 
However, this study found no evidence that emergency management organizations include 
senior public officiais in the conduct of their training and exercises. 
The above inhibitors indisputably constitute areas to which attention must be paid 
in order to enhance decision-making. However. the issue of miscornmunication dunng a 
crisis situation also has the potential to impair decision-making, irrespective of the technique 
used, and is equally deserving of attention. The inability to capture and transfer clear, 
timely, relevant, reliable, valid and comprehensive information jeopardizes the decision- 
makers' capacity to meaningfully evaluate any choices available in the course of disaster 
response. Because sound decisions rely so heavily upon the collection and evaluation of 
information, addressing the problem of miscommunication necessitates a detailed 
examination of information as it relates to crisis management. 
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CHAPTER 3 - INFORMATION 
Introduction 
This chapter looks more closely at the principle expressed at the end of Chapter two 
that sound decisions, especially in crisis situations, rely on the effective transfer of 
meaningful information. It provides an analysis of the information requirements associated 
with an emergency management information system, proposes requirement-driven solutions 
to the informational problems set out at Chapter one, and establishes the framework 
wherein a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency emergency management model, upon which 
to build an emergency management information system, can be conceptualized. The model 
is more fully refined in the next chapter. 
Informational Problem Analysis 
Appendix F evolved in the course of this chapter's development. It served to clarîfy 
Chapter one's Statement of the Problem by concisely listing each criticism found at the 
various 1997 Red River Basin flood after-action reports, along with its corresponding 
possible causes. As the analysis of the problems and their potential causes progressed, 
it was determined that the causal factors of one problem could themselves be translated 
into problems. For example, one possible cause of the reported problem that "information 
was treated as proprietary" was identified to be that 'each provincial department seerned 
to run independently and had its own intemal source of information and relied solely on its 
own field people to gather intelligence." This cause was found to be a problem ont0 itself. 
When a potential cause could be considered as a problem, it was copied to the 
'problem" column and analysed in turn, The process continued until a problem's cause 
finally revealed itself as a Yack" of some function or capability. The analysis concludes that 
the informational and decision-making problerns experienced during the Red River Basin 
flood of 1997 can be attributed to a lack of staff (STAFF). liaison personnel (LO), training 
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and education (TRG), procedures, and, more gemane to this study, a lack of an integrated 
emergency management information system (CJMA). In fact, of the 34 problerns analysed, 
24 of them c m  be shown to be directly related to the absence of a cross-jurisdicüonal, multi- 
agency emergency management information system (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 - Diagrammatic Representation of Appendix F 
Information Requirements - Interview Findings 
Interviews aimed at specifying information linkages and requirements at the LA €OC 
were conducted with four of the seven emergency coordinators who were in office during 
the Red River Basin flood of 1997 using the questionnaire at Appendk B. Although it was 
hoped that the interview questions posed to the former local emergency coordinators would 
generate more meaningful data, the intewiews were constrained mainly by the tirne lapsed 
since the event. All respondents reported that a clear recollection of the specifics under 
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investigation, after three years, was diff~cult. Moreover, in some cases, strong residual 
ernotion got in the way of objective recounting and. in other cases, many of the questions 
sirnply did not apply. The most surprising constraint experienced was that many 
respondents had difficulty expressing andlor understanding the fundamentals of 
EOCIEOCC operation and identifying the information requirements that might have made 
the task easier tu manage had they been in place. A genera! sentiment recorded during the 
interviews was that none of them would be eager to act in the capacity of an emergency 
coordinator again due to the difliculties experienced. 
The interviews conducted with senior emergency management officiais at the 
provincial govemment level to establish information requirements at the EOCC served to 
provide hnro more examples of uniquely different structures with correspondingly distinct 
information system concepts and reporting lines (the first example is shown at Figure 2). 
The interview conducted with the behavioural scientists at the Defence and Civil 
Institute of Environmental Medicine confirmed the challenge of capturing the flow of 
information through complex space, i.e., moving through different jurisdictions and agency 
boundaries, each with different cultures, values, regulations, procedures, and information 
networks'. 
The interviews conducted and the information obtained at the federal level provided 
the greatest level of assistance in conceptualizing the fiow of information through the 
emergency response structure. 
All interviews confirmed and supported the requirement of this study's aim. The 
absence of a standard emergency management information system spanning the 
jurisdictions of govemment and the boundaries of the many agencies involved in responding 
1 See Glossary, 
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to emergencies was acknowledged, as was the ineffectiveness of those existing hierarchical 
diagrams that are intended to show communication flow. The informational and decision- 
making problems, as found at Chapter one. and the urgent requirement to address these 
were also confirmed. 
Information Requirements 
Ideally, an emergency management organization is supported by a well-coordinated, 
integrated crisis management structure and a conesponding information system which 
together facilitate the collection, analysis, processing, transfer, and management of 
information. Moreover, on paper, there may be well-organized, efficient education and 
training programs, policies, and procedures to guide governmental activity and decision- 
making during disaster circurnstances. But in practice, as stated earlier in chapter one's 
Staternent of the Problem, as confirmed by those emergency coordinators who were 
interviewed, and as observed by the author, the process of managing crises is prone to 
operate quite differently. Schneider's suggestion that overall govemmental emergency 
management is "more accurately described as disconnected and uncoordinated," and 
'neither clearly articulated, completely supported. nor fully developedn supports the 
problematic observations of the 1997 Red River Basin Rood's after-action reports, the 
anecdotal information gleaned from the interviews with local emergency coordinators, and 
this author's personai experience (1995, pp. 37,39). 
Indeed, Ernst and Young (1398), Tait and Rahman (1997), the City of Winnipeg 
(1 998), the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (1 998), the Manitoba Water Commission (1 997), 
and those emergency coordinators of the flood valley who were involved in the 
management of their municipal response al1 agreed that communications across municipal, 
provincial and federal jurisdictions, in general, were uncoordinated. This undesirable 
condition was exacerbated by response activities which dernanded extraordinary cross- 
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jurisdictional and multi-agency cooperation. As a result, organizational delay, confusion, 
and impaired disaster response were inevitable. 
The challenge, therefore, is to set out a framework within which information and 
cnsis decision-making are wholly integrated. But, before engaging in building such a 
frarnework or rnodel, it is important to examine the specifics of the infonation that usually 
flows through the ernergency management information system. 
Decision-Makino Information. Whether crisis management is successful or not is, in 
part, gauged by how well emergency management organizations cope with the 
communication process2, information flow, exercise of authority, and decision-making 
(Hightower and Coutu. 1996). In other words, effective cnsis management depends upon 
the error-free transmission of meaning3 and the ability of managers to use infonation in the 
reduction of uncertainty4 and in support of expeditious decision-making. 
'Crisis information must be effectively linked with decision-making" (Rosenthal, et 
al., 1989, p. 21 ). However, communicating information to coordinate activities and 
resources, across jurisdictional lines and among many differing agencies, is a complicated 
2 Lasswell identifies five major elements that conceptualize the communication 
process: source users, messages, channels, destination users, and effects. The importance of 
differentiating and identifying the source users originating communications iç based on the 
assumption that the meaning and authoritativeness of the infonation will Vary dependant on the 
source user. Once the information is suitably processed, it is distnbuted as a message, which 
incorporates the rneaning that the source user intended to convey. This message is distributed 
through channels to the destination user(s). The received messages produce a predeterrnined 
effect or, contrarily, an unexpected effect (1 971, p. 84). A sixth element, described by Graber 
(1992, p. 5), perrnits leaming frorn past actions and incorporation of this new knowledge into 
future actions. Feedback bears information about the effect produced by the message and the 
consequences attributable to it. ltalicized ternis are defined at the Glossary. 
3 See Glossary. 
1 Uncertainty, a term also associated with risk and instability, generates confusion 
and lack of understanding. When information is missing, unreliable, ambiguous, inconsistent, or 
too complex to interpret, uncertainty prevails and decision-makers are reluctant to act, 
Unfortunately, by the tirne they do, the action has already been potentially delayed or has been 
overtaken by events (KIein, 1999, pp. 276-277). 
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task. Pigeau and McCann, for example, in their third in a series of papers that reasserts the 
vital importance of the human in Command and Control (C2), focus on the establishment 
and communication of common intent, and its follow-on transformation into coordinated 
action (1998, p. 1). 
Common intent, according to Pigeau and McCann, is a combination of an explicit 
aspiration and an operationally-relevant implicit interpretation, both of which muçt be shared 
between the parties involved in the achievement of coordinated activity (Ibid.,~. 9). The 
"explicit" nature of common intent means that it is conscious and publicly accessible. 
Moreover, this explicitness is the primary mechanism for initiating and maintaining goal- 
directed action among multiple rnembers of a team or organizations. 
Explicit aspiration is usually expressed in terms of goals or objectives, which are 
communicated using some modality (e.g., verbal, visual, written, etc.) and transferred from 
a source user to a destination user by way of some medium5 (Ibid, p. 3). Moreover, it 
demands a baseline level of literacy in the language being used; an available. high capacity, 
and reliable communications channe16; and a cornmon teninology (Ibid., p. 6). Common 
teminology is particularly essential in an emergency management information system 
because it provides meaning to such ternis as, position titles, disaster classification 
systems, emergency plan and implementing procedures, and assists those involved in the 
emergency management process to understand acronyms (Sikich, 1996, p. 69). The 
participation of many players across many jurisdictions and agencies usually implies slightly 
different rneaning for terms. This phenomenon adds to confusion and inefficiency. 
Therefore, a concerted effort led by the provincial/territoriaI EOCC and supported by ail 
s See Glossary. 
B See Glossary. 
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departments, agencies, and LAS involved is necessary to implement common language and 
standard terminology. It can be as basic as establishing naming conventions for al1 
personnel, equipment, resources, and facilities in and around the disaster area. (FEMA, 
n.d., p. 1-12) 
However, Pigeau and McCann elaborate that meeting these conditions, albeit 
necessary to communications, does not suffice to assure the common achievement of an 
explicit aspiration. Group dialogue, 'backbriefs," questions and arguments are also 
important to this goal. They cite as an example Pask, who posits that the test to know 
whether a communication was actually understood is to have it reiterated using different 
words (1 976). 
Once the explicit aspiration is properly comrnunicated, it still only constitutes a 
portion of common intent - the precursor to coordinated action (Pigeau and McCann. 1998). 
In an environment of high intensity, high stakes, and high demands such as emergency 
management operations, time constraints and the consequence of delay may deny devoting 
excessive amounts of time to sharing explicit aspiration. Pigeau and McCann propose, 
therefore, that "only overlapping implicit intent can maximize successn (Ibid.). 
The "implicit" nature of intent is largely unconscious and tacit (Ibid., p. 1 ). It refers 
to connotations which are subject to the influence of expectations, beliefs. andlor values, 
and which are latent within a specific goal (Ibid., p. 4). Establishing shared implicit 
interpretation is not an exercise that can be conducted on the spur of the moment. Rather, 
it is 'a critical preparatory activityn that requires support at al1 jurisdictions, by way of 
championing continuous education and training programs to which considerable time and 
effort must be devoted (Ibid., p. 6). These programs must emphasize the development of 
a consistent set of emergency management values and must encourage emergency 
management practitioners, elected officials and appointed officials at all levels of 
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government to be exposed to each others' expectations and beliefs in cnsis circumstances 
(Ibid., p. 7). 
Coordination Information. At the beginning of a locally centred crisis, while the LA'S 
irnmediate concem is the protection of life and property, considerable attention must be paid 
to the acquisition and allocation of the resources7 required to combat the threat to the 
community. LA resources may be immediately available in suitable quantities, and there 
rnay not yet seern to be justification to request support from neighbouring communities or 
the next higher level of govemment. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that non-local 
authorities in proximity will be rendering assistance by providing their own resources to the 
fight. It is also reasonable to assume that nearby provincial/temitorial and federal 
department offices may also lend assistance by virtue of their proximity to the crisis. 
Provision of supportfrom these government agents located within the LA'S boundaries does 
not constitute a breech of the principle that the LA must expend its resources before 
requesting the next level of govemmental assistance. Rather, it is because these "externaln 
organizations form part of the community that their involvement is natural. 
In the course of responding to the emergency, resources move from one location 
to another depending on where they are needed most, and the LA EOC will be expected 
to know where these resources are and when they will be available next. As the situation 
worsens, al1 of the resources within the LA'S boundaries may eventually be committed to 
fighting the disaster's effects, as may those belonging to the private sector, neighbouring 
communities, and local offices of the provincialltemtonal and federal govemments. 
7 Resources used in emergency operations are described by kind and type, and 
consist of ail personnel and major items of equiprnent (including the crews required to operate 
and rnaintain them) that are available, or potentially available, for assignment to incidents. 
Resource kinds relate to hrnction, whereas resource types relate to capability (FEMA, 1998, p. 4- 
2). 
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At the request of the LA, the province or temtory may fomally commit its own 
resources frorn various departments. and if necessary, federal resources may also be 
corrmitted at the request of the province or temtory. Message traffic conceming the 
tracking, allocation, and status of resources employed in support of the emergency 
comprise the bulk of the information that flows through the emergency management 
information system. It follows that the effective management of resources, especially if 
these originate from different agencies and from different jurisdictions, is a vital 
consideration in the discussion of information management. Without information, the 
correct resources to accomplish the task, to ensure resource safety, and to ensure cost- 
effective operation cannot be identified, selected or allocated, and the status of al1 resources 
assigned to an incident cannot be rnaintained. 
Provincialiterritorial and federal offices within the boundaries of the affected LA that 
are providing support to the emergency will be in communication with their parent 
departments from the start. As they become more involved and as the potential for a fonal  
assistance request increases. the requirement for the parent departments to coordinate 
their activities and resource allocations appreciates. Departmental operations offices andfor 
EOCs must maintain contact with their representatives at the local level throughout the 
emergency's duration. Likewise, because of the potential for a forrnal assistance request, 
the provincial/temtorial and federal EOCCs must also be monitoring8 the local situation. In 
this manner, if the situation worsens or if there are any unanticipated operational needs for 
provinciallterritoriaI and federal resources elsewhere, the government is better situated to 
provide an adequate response or to make a more infomed decision regarding the allocation 
of its resources. 
a The monitoring function which the EOCC undertakes could either be by way of 
dispatching an LO or by establishing a direct channei of communications with the LA EOC. 
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Because of the reliance on resource information, al1 organizations, agencies, and 
deparbnents at al1 levels of govemment likely to be involved in emergency response activity 
must maintain a current inventory of resources that they can draw upon during an 
emergency. A list of resource information that is typically required at the local level is 
provided at Appendix D. Similar lists are necessary at provincial/territorial and federal 
Ievels. 
During the disaster, status information identifying the condition of the resources rnust 
also be made available. Effective coordination requires the use of information of assigned 
resources that are perfoning active functions, of available resources that are ready for 
immediate assignment, and of out-of-service resources that are not yet ready for 
açsignment. This information must be originated by those who control the resources. 
Liaison Information. When source information is potentially unreliable, the 
placement of qualified emergency management liaison personnel on-site heightens the 
credibility of the sources. Moreover, the implementation of communication protocols to and 
from these more credible sources increases the level of confidence in the information 
received by them. The sooner a trained and experienced Liaison Offcer (LO) is dispatched 
from the provincial or territorial EMO, the better. 
Having an LO at the disaster location to conduct impartial observation and to relay 
meaningful information directly back to the EOCC, contributes to the reduction of 
uncertainty and to the improvement of coordinating, planning, and decision-making. By 
virtue of their training and experience, LOS are capable of facilitating the fiow of information, 
assisüng in the prioritization of resource requests, and filtering extraneous from significant 
information. Equally important, LOS are qualified to provide relevant advice and assistance 
to the impacted community. Although it is beneficial that liaison personnel be familiar with 
the local conditions, it iç essential that they be capable of incorporating local knowledge in 
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their communications with the EOCC. 
Public Information. An uninfonned public is unpredictable (FEMA, n.d., p. 5-18). 
Media and liaison can be effective instruments in keeping the public infomed. However, it 
is important that the information comrnunicated to the public be stated factually, in ternis 
that it will understand, and in ternis that will satisfy its needs as opposed to solely the 
organization's expectations. Organizations tend to be unable to grasp that information they 
deem vital may not necessarily be vital to the people in the disaster area (Quarantelli, 1 985, 
p. 13; Lerbinger, 1997, p. 32). Release of information must also be well tirned. In other 
wordç, releasing information before al1 the facts are known is ill-advised. Moreover, it is 
important that the problem and corresponding actions be described carefully and reported 
succinctly and clearly. Those responsible for communicating to the public must use simple, 
non-technical language and must be sensitive to the local dialect (Lerbinger, 1997. p. 280). 
If the public receives information that they do not perceive is credible, that does not 
serve to reduce their fears or uncertainties. or that does not feed any sense of denial they 
might have about the cnsis, then they may look elsewhere and place more reliance on 
informa1 and unconventional sources of information (Schneider, 1995, p. 51). According to 
Graber, information carried by informal channels is typically more widespread, often more 
timely, and reportedly more accurate. However, she wams that 'grapevine* communication 
has several drawbacks. It is unsystematic and generally generated and driven by self- 
interest. Moreover, its use may often be restricted to privileged groups. Worse, the 
information camed over the "grapevine" may degenerate into mmour, which involves the 
circulation of unsubstantiated and often erroneous information, particularly in time of crisis 
when information is already scarce to some (1 992, pp. 109-i 1 O; Heath, 1998. p.? 19). 
FEMA wams that rumeurs are sometimes as dangerous as the emergency itself and 
recommends that the facts andlor updates surrounding the situation be communicated as 
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soon as practicable and as often as required (n.d., p. 5-20). Gaining control over rurnours 
is essential to the establishment of public calrn (Ibid.) 
Pre-disaster publicsafety and awareness campaigns must be conducted with a view 
to providing the public with the information that it may need in tirnes of crisis and to provide 
it with an opportunity to better understand the hazards that are of priority concem in their 
area in order that it can better prepare for, respond to, and recover from any disaster or 
emergency that could strike the comrnunity. Education programs of this sort also provide 
insight into the emergency response structure and the services it has to offer (FEMA, n.d., 
p. 5-21). 
Too Much Information. Although bureaucracies may effectively handle information 
relating to routine events, even large scale ones, the convergence of information and the 
denser information low associated with catastrophic events can quickly and easily overload 
decision-makers. The main reasons for information-overload relate to the number of 
channels available and individual channel capacity. Busy signals and telephones ringing 
open at a coordination centre are clearly unacceptable conditions. Consideration must be 
afforded to the number of channels necessary to cary ail of the information and to the 
capacity of each individual channel. Moreover, organizations must develop satisfactory 
ways to screen incoming messages so that those of higher priority can be identified 
immediately and routed without delay to their intended destination (Graber, 1992, p. 21). 
Because victims of disaster need information about the situation they are 
experiencing, they may unintentionally impose added stress on responding agencies and 
departments by saturating them with inquiries. The consequent burden on communication 
channels that would otherwise be used to manage emergency reçponse and coordinate 
acüvity and resources, not to mention the additional stress placed on the recipients of the 
requests, rnay also cause overload and breakdown (Auf der Heide, 1989). Provision must 
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be made for separate information channels for public use. 
Another reason for infonnation-overload is the complexity of the cross-jurisdictional 
and rnulti-agency network (see Figure 1) into which ail disaster-related information is 
inputted and through which it travels. Identical messages cm, potentially, be inputted at 
multiple points in the network contributing not only to redundancy but to blockages as well. 
At the local and provincial/temtorial level, there are no information filters or screens to sort 
and route information along its way in the existing ernergency management structure. A 
concentrated effort on the part of emergency management planners is therefore necessary 
to regulate information fiows and to remedy the paradox of having too little meaningful 
information on the one hand and too much information on the other. 
Meaningful information not only plays a critical role in reducing uncertainty, but it 
expands the range of options available to the decision-rnaker, provides some structure to 
complexity, and generates a greater situational awareness (Gangue and Romet, 1996, p. 
3). However, it must be differentiated from infonation quantity. Simply adding more 
information into the decision-making cycle does not necessarily reduce the uncertainty 
decision-rnakers face or their reluctance to act. Rather, it is more likely that increasing the 
information toad will introduce more information that lacks relevance, contributes little new 
knowledge, andlor is misleading and erroneous. It may also increase delay and, in the 
process, cause the decision-rnaker to lose opportunity. These exacerbations are 
undesirable, hindering, and potentially dangerous to decision-making. 
Quoting James Q. Wilson, Graber makes the point that quantity of information does 
not necessarily constitute full. accurate and properly nuanced body of knowledge about 
important rnatters." Rather. it may constitute 'a torrent of incomplete facts, opinions, 
guesses, and self-serving statements about distant events" (Graber, 1992, p. 56). 
Information fiow regulaüons and procedures rnay become necessaiy to prevent an 
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information overload. 
During the Red River Basin flood of 1997. water fiow reports/forecasts were 
generated, once daily, by the provincial Department of Natural Resources and distributed 
to a list of interested departments and agencies such as the Regional EPC Director, the 
provincial EMO, and the Canadian Forces Domestic Operations Officer for the Province of 
Manitoba. On receipt of this reporüforecast the provincial €MO would redistribute it to its 
list of interested departments and agencies, including the Regional EPC Director and the 
Amy's Domestic Operations Officer. Likewise, on receipt of this reporüforecast the 
Regional EPC office would redistnbute it to its list of interested departments and agencies, 
including the Armyts Domestic Operations Officer. By the end of the day, many 
departments and agencies had too many copies of this reportlforecast. Tragically, as 
recounted by a local emergency coordinator, the LA had none. One type of regulation or 
procedure that rnight prevent this sort of information overload occurrence would be to 
impose a careful restriction on the number, length, or subject matter of inter-jurisdictional 
communications. On the matter of omitting the LA from the distribution list, more attention 
ought to have been paid to ensuring that those who needed information got infomation. 
Auf der Heide's recomrnendation that al1 but the most essential information be 
subjected to a tnage, is a good one (1989, pp. 55-56). This concept would involve the 
objective evaluation and classification of infomation for purposes of further pmcessing and 
transfer and would consist of the immediate sorting of information according to its 
significance to the disaster circumstance. However, a tnage system must only be 
implemented on the condition that the personnel or automated equipment performing the 
filtering is capable of relating the information's significance to the overall disaster effort 
without prejudices or preference (Ibid.). 
The fact that some individuals, with whom the responsibility for conveying 
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information is placed, will lack experience and familiarity with the non-routine manner of 
communications may result in the wrong people getting the information (Auf der Heide, 
1989; Drabek et al., 1981 ; Dynes, IWO; QuaranteIli, l982,1985). Serious problems adse 
when non-emergency management personnel and professionals alike do not understand 
the pre-established framework, when they consciously ignore it, or when they deliberately 
take steps to circumvent standard operating procedures (Schneider, 1995, p. 37). It follows 
that al1 who are directly involved in the emergency management process at the LA level 
must understand the structure and operation of the entire governrnental response system 
and abide by it. 
Information Flow 
Beginning at the LA, where the responsibility for emergency response is maintained 
from the initial threat of disaster to the final stages of recovery, information is generated and 
consumed by emergency responders, emergency management officials, elected and 
appointed public officials, and the local media. To reduce confusion and redundancy, it is 
vital that the information flow be tailored to meet the requirements of those involved, 
according to their specific and unique functions vis-a-vis the situation. Destination users 
are concemed only with the information that relates to their functional involvement and 
correspond to their particular expertise. Those individuais involved in coordinating activity 
and resources are not likely to find public affairs information very useful. Likewise, the 
offtcer in charge of public works should not be answering health and welfare inquiries. 
Misdirected information must be rerouted to the intended destination user as quickly as 
practicable. Nevertheless, a complete record of al1 information received, dispatched, or 
rerouted must be maintained (i.e., compiled, analysed, and prepared for use by decision- 
makers) in order that information can be readily shared and made available to the local 
coordinator andlor senior decision-makers, and in order that it cstn be found and retrieved 
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at a later time for auditing, accounting, and leaming purposes. 
When provincialltemtonal support is formally brought to bear on the response effort, 
the information requirements are increased and the information system expands, becornes 
more entangled, and demands integration. Information not only continues to flow 
horizontally on the local plane but must now travel vertically to the provincial or territorial 
EOCC and from there horizontally again to the departments involved. Vertical 
communications should follow functional lines. As mentioned earlier, destination users are 
best equipped to deal with the information that relates to their functional involvement and 
correspond to their particular expertise. Whether travelling horizontally or vertically, the 
information rnust fiow in an orderly way between its sources and its destinations, with four 
basic objectives in mind: 
0 decision areas, decision criteria, and decision rules must be identified, 
CI information requirements must be specified, 
O tirne to refer to a data bank for detailed information rnust be identified, and 
O those who are engaged in the decision-making must be allowed to retrieve 
and to process information easily and to put it to use (Hirsch, 1969, p.13). 
Information fiows are further complicated by the fact that staff and resources 
belonging to various departments, agencies, NGOs, and the private sector may already be 
supporting the emergency and vital decision-making information may already be travelling 
directly to their parent operations centres in addition to, or to the exclusion of, the local EOC 
and the provincial or territorial EOCC. 
Emergency management officiais frorn every organization. department. and agency 
at every level of government are theoretically supposed to mobilize and organize available 
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resources within their respective jurisdictions. However, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
coordinate the actions of al1 the supporthg agencies and departments particularly because 
each has its own set rules, regulations, policies, and information network. 
When resources and personnel from these multiple agencies and across many 
jurisdictions are deployed, existing channels from the provincial/temtorial and federal agents 
to their parent departments must remain open. However, there must now be additional and 
complernentary communications links established from those parent departrnents to the 
provincial EOCC, which is in a better position to grasp the total provincial effort being 
expended, to centrally coordinate the total resources being allocated at the disaster site, to 
watch for other crises that may arise within the province, and to rnonitor the existing 
situation for signs of escalations. Allowing the provincial EOCC to carry out its mandate of 
providing central coordination to the crisis, and thereby providing a single point of contact 
for public inquiry, reduces the potential for transferring confiicting information to the public, 
to the other departments and agencies involved, as well as to the media. 
Once the federal governrneot and its resources becorne involved and another layer 
of coordination is appended to the already complex communication netvvork, information 
requirernents are increased dramatically. This does not mean that everything about the 
situation can or must be known. Information requirements must be assessed wisely and 
information flows must be guided properly. 'Without effective and responsible information 
managemen?, the Rood tide of information can becorne a menance rather than an asset" 
(Graber, 1992, p. 4). 
Depending on the çcope of the crisiç, information requirements will Vary. For 
example, additional information requirernents are imposed when the situation demands 
9 See Glossary. 
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specialist or technical knowledge of the hazard (i.e.. chernical, biological, nuclear disasters), 
experts may be required to analyse technical information, to interpret and clarify ambiguous 
infomation, or to cross-reference complex information with relevant databases. A 
representative sample of the provincialltenitorial and federal information requirements is at 
Appendix E. 
Information Requirements and Flow in the Context of "Who's in Charge" 
In light of the overwhelrning information and coordination requirements associated 
with emergency management. it is possible to lose sight of where the ultimate responsibility 
for response lies. Officiais at both provincial/territorial and federal levels must appreciate 
and accept their role as supporting in nature and. in keeping with Canadian emergency 
management guidelines, not usurp the LA'S responsibility and authority in disaster response 
activities. Responders, including the Canadian Forces, must be knowledgeable about their 
own roles and responsibilities. as well as how their actions relate to those others involved 
in the emergency management process (Schneider, 1995, p. 36). When perceptions differ 
across governmental levels about where the authority and responsibility are vested, there 
are likely to be complications. confusion, and even breakdowns in the management of the 
situation (Ibid., p. 38). An effective disaster response can be mounted only when everyone 
understands the overall framework presented by a cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency 
environment (McLoughlin, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 4 - A CROSS=JURISDICT1ONAL, MULTI-AGENCY INFORMATION MODEL 
Introduction 
The effectiveness of emergency management, in a large degree, depends on how 
well decisions are made. How well these are made, how sound judgement is actualized, 
and how objectives are achieved in tum depends on the presence and effectiveness of 
framework or model within which information and crisis decision-making are wholly 
integrated (Erickson, 1999. p. 44). A well-designed information system is "the most 
important tool of crisis management" (Heath, 1998, p. 114). This chapter builds a model 
upon which subsequent design and implementation of such a systeni may be undertaken. 
Structured Systems Design Analysis Methodology (SSADM) provides the basis for 
the construction of the model. In broad tens ,  SSADM demands that three types of 
questions be addressed successively, namely: questions of definition, functionality. and 
physical organization. The fint, addresses the problem to be solved rather than the 
solution. The second addresses the solution, and the third addresses the technical aspects 
of the solution (DMR, 1984, pp. 25-26). To satisfy the aim of the study, Le., to propose a 
simple and effective cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency information model in support of 
emergency management, the SSADM process was abbreviated. Because the proposed 
model serves as a platforni for further study, discussion, and testing, the technical aspects 
of the model must be reserved for subsequent study. 
Construction 
The model's construction process is divided into two corresponding phases. In the 
conceptual phase the informational problems related to the Red River Basin flood of 1997 
at Chapter one, the general informational problems related to decision-making at Chapter 
two, and the information requirements at Chapter three are analysed, interpreted and 
strategically defined, Le., independent from the way the follow-on systern would actually 
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function and the technology that would be used. In the functional phase, which represents 
the way the information system could function, the processes. theii interactions with each 
other, and the paths they use to access the information are defined. 
The development of the model in this study is conducted frorn the highest level and 
presents a general and conceptual view of the information system. The model is 
conceptualized as a construct that operates within a larger integrated environment. which 
includes personnel; facilities: standard operating procedures; regulations; financial, 
administrative and logistic support; organizational management functions; and other 
emergency response systems. It depicts interna1 and extemal "entities'" and "information 
flows2" giving an overview of the system without elaborating on 'relationships3." "attributes4." 
"infornation stores5.* or processes which must be decided later in the design phases of 
systems development. 
Objectives 
The information model supporting crisis decision-making and the achievement of 
common emergency management goals is designed to increase the shared understanding 
of the situation and to facilitate appropriate, coordinated, rnulti-agency action across 
jurisdictions, according to Comfort's suggestions (1 989). In keeping with Garigue and 
Romet's recommendations, its interfaces are minimal and simple and its information flow 
is restricted to essentials (1996, p. 33). Based on the the guidelines set out by the US. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (1995), which are in agreement with the findings of this study, the 
1 See Glossary. 
2 See Glossary, 
3 See Glossary. 
4 See Glossary. 
s See Glossary. 
Page 4-2 
model is established on the requirement for continuous information and serves the following 
objectives: 
a 
O 
a 
0 
help public officials and practitioners of emergency management combine 
the thoughts and impressions of multiple responding agencies, across 
multiple jurisdictions to allow the views of many experts to be brought to 
bear on any given task, 
help public officials and practitioners of emergency management formulate 
accurate perceptions and rnake effective action decisions, 
respond quickly to requests for information, and places and maintains that 
information, in a usable forrn, where it is needed, and 
fusee information to produce a factual picture of the disaster area and 
situation that meets the needs of responders and decision-rnakers alike (p. 
viii). 
In short, the information model is rneant to promote the uninterrupted and timely 
transfer of meaningful information to the intended destinations in a form that will be useable 
upon receipt. 
Establishing Parameters for An Integrated Framework 
Coordination Tiers. Emergency response encompasses the assessrnent of incident 
priorities, the detemination of operational objectives, the development and implementation 
of an action plan, the management of incident resources, and the coordination of overall 
emergency activities including those of outside agencies. In a small scale emergency, 
these tasks may be managed solely by the first responden (Le., public works, police. fire, 
or ambulance personnel). However, when the circumstances approach crisis proportions 
and raise public concern and media attention, there may be a requirement to establish a 
B See Information Fusion at Glosary. 
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local focal point of response operations. Likewise. as each higher level of govemment 
becomes involved, there may be a requirement for corresponding focal points of 
coordination. 
First Tier - The LA Erneroencv O~erations Centre (EOC). As mentioned at Chapter 
one. the LA EOC serves as the single location where local emergency services department 
heads, municipal govomrnent oficials (both elected and appointpd), and othor selocted 
personnel gather to oversee, to direct, and to coordinate the on-site response to a crisis. 
Its establishment, however, does not preclude other organizations who are providing 
assistance or resources to the emergency from establishing separate EOCs to track the 
allocation and status of their own resources. The important consideration is to provide 
working interfaces between the LA EOC, other EOCs, and the ernergency responders at 
the crisis çcene to permit the rapid transfer of information and to facilitate decision-making. 
In theory, al1 EOCs are structured to accornplish the same objectives. Therefore, 
the first tier's entities apply equally well to any EOC. Based on Chapter one's Statement 
of the Problem, confirmatory information acquired in the course of the interviews conducted, 
and Chapter three's Information Requirements, the common entities include Executive, 
Coordination, Planning and Advice, Public Affairs, and Triage. Although these comrnon 
entities are wholly integrated from an informational perspective, they should, as much as 
practicable, be physically isolated from each other, Le.. compartmentalized. This 
compartmentalization is not to be confused with the concept of 'stovepiping." All that is 
meant here is that decision-maken be afforded space away frorn the noise of the 
coordination centre. Likewise, the planners and the public affairs personnel, and those 
responsible for triage, should al1 be afforded their separate space. 
Executive. This entity represents the decision-making that impacts on the overall 
management of the emergency response. Executive decision-making can only be 
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undertaken by those with the requisite legal authority, Le., the 'executive." For example, in 
the case of the LA, the execuüve is restricted to the chief elected official and other legally 
delegated officers or officiais as appointed by the chief elected official. In other EOCs 
executive authority may rest with the senior oftïcer in charge of the organization to which 
the EOC belongs, or with other legally delegated officers as nominated by the senior officer 
in charge. In any case, the Executive entity is publicly accountable for the decisions it 
makes. The local emergency coordinator should be invited to attend the entity's decision- 
making meetings as its advisor. 
Plannina and Advice. The Planning entity represents the analysis of information7 
about the development of the crisis, the detenination of future requirements and the 
conduct of short and long-term planning, the issuance of plans, the assignment of priorities 
to tasks, the provision of technical and planning advice to the Executive entity, and the 
dissemination of the Executive entity's goals and objectives. The Planning and Advice 
entity is staffed by local emergency management practitioners who are qualified in the 
conduct of planning activities andlor by technical specialists as required by the emergency 
situation. The head of the planning entity should be appointed by the local emergency 
coordinator. 
Coordination. This entity represents the implementation of the emergency response 
plan issued by Planning. Its information processing8 functions include directing and 
coordinating the response activities prescribed by the Planning entity; requesting andlor 
releasing resources; tracking resource allocation and status; ensuring continuity of 
communications within the €OC, as well as to and from the emergency site; and keeping 
7 See information Analysis at the Glossary. 
a See Glossary. 
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current of al1 operations activities surrounding the imrnediate situation. This entity may be 
staffed by local emergency management practitioners, but is usually staffed by local 
department heads or officiais who have been trained in EOC operations. The head of the 
Coordination entity is the local emergency coordinator. Personnel who are staffing the 
Coordination entity should, as much as practicable, have specific and unique responsibilities 
vis-a-vis the situation and should be discouraged from fiitting about in areas where they 
have no experience or business. 
Public Affai~. The Public Affairs entity represents the formulation and release of 
information about the incident to news reporters and broadcast stations, on approval from 
the Executive entity or its delegated representative entity, e.g.. Planning and Advice. The 
Public Affairs entity's information processing functions include monitoring, as completely as 
practicable, ali relevant broadcasts on al1 networks and on al1 communications means ( ie.,  
radio. TV. Intemet); correcting errors in fact or in misrepresented stories: and providing 
advice to the Executive Decision-Making entity with respect to misrepresented coverage. 
This entity should, as much as practicable. be staffed by personnel who have experience 
in dealing with the media. The head of the Public Affairs entity should be appointed by the 
Executive entity. 
Triaqe. The Triage entity represents the collectiong of information (e-g.. answering 
incoming calls) and the vetting and rouüng of information. It includes the imrnediate sorting 
and transfer of information1° according to its significance to the disaster circumstance and 
the redirection of public inquiry calls to a location or entity within the larger integrated 
environment outside the EOC framework. It can be staffed by anyone provided they have 
9 See Glossary. 
'O See Glossary. 
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the proper indoctrination, operator-rnanuals, and directories. The head of the Triage entity 
should be appointed by the local emergency coordinator with input from the Executive 
entity. 
Second Tier -The Provincial/Temtorial Emeraencv Operations Coordination Centre 
[EOCC). The EOCC is established within provincial or temtorial jurisdiction to coordinate 
the allocation of resources provided by the province or territory on request from, and in 
support of, the LA during a disaster event, until such time as the LA can resume its routine 
operations unassisted. Unlike the LA or any other EOCs. the EOCC has no direct control 
of resources, Le.. it does not own any. Moreover, the provincialltemtorial departmental and 
agency participation necessitates a larger Executive entity compnsed of many more public 
officials than at the local EOC. Therefore. there are minor adjustrnents to the descn'ptions 
of the second tier's entities required. However. with those exceptions, the structure is 
identical. Once more, although the second tier entities are wholly integrated from an 
informational perspective, they should, as much as practicable, be physically isolated from 
each other, i.e., compartmentalized. 
Executive. This entity represents the decision-making that impacts on the overall 
coordination of the emergency response. Executive decision-making can only be 
undertaken by those with the requisite legal authority. For example. in the case of the 
provincial or temtorial govemment, the executive is restricted to departmental deputy 
ministers andlor assistant deputy ministen, Special Operating Agency Chief Executive 
Officers. and other senior officials whose organizations are. or are likely to be involved in 
responding to the crisis. The head of the Executive entity at the provincial/territorial tier is 
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the minister responsible for the Emergency Measures Actor equivalent legal arrangement1'. 
The Executive entity is publicly accountable for the decisions they make. The 
provincialitemtorial EMO Director should be invited to attend the Executive entity's decision- 
making meetings as its advisor. 
Plannina and Advice. The Planning entity represents the analysis of information 
about the development of the crisis, the detemination of future requirernents and the 
conduct of short and long-terni planning, the issuance of plans, assignment of priorities to 
tasks, the provision of technical and planning advice to the Executive entity, and the 
dissemination of the Executive entity's goals and objectives. The Plann ing and Advice 
entity is staffed by provinciallterritorial emergency management practitioners who are 
qualified in the conduct of planning activities andlor by technical specialists as required by 
the emergency situation. The head of the planning entity should be appointed by the 
provincial/territorial EMO Director. 
Coordination. This entity represents the implementation of the emergency response 
coordination plan issued by the Planning and Advice entity. Its information processing 
functions include coordinating the response activities prescribed by the Planning and 
Advice entity; requesting andior releasing resources from provinciallte~torial departments 
or agencies; tracking resource allocation and status; ensuring continuity of communications 
within the EOCC, as well as to and from al1 external entities; and keeping curent of al1 
operations activities surrounding the immediate situation. This entity may be staffed by 
11 At the time of this writing, the ministers responsible for the Emergency Measures 
Act or equivalent legal arrangement Vary frorn province to province, e.g., Minster of Governrnent 
Services (Manitoba), Solicitor General (Ontario), Minister of Municipal Affairs (Alberta). Although 
beyond the scope of this study, there appean to be difficulty with these arrangements in that 
other departmental rninisters rnay not be as responsive to anothet minister as they would be to a 
higher level of authority. It could not be determined with certainty, however, there is a Iikelihood 
that the 'political bamers" rnentioned at Chapter one might relate to this potential difficulty. 
Further study in the area of "where" provinciaVtemtoriaI EMOs should fit within their govemrnental 
organizational structure is recommended. 
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provincialltemtorial emergency management practitioners, but is usually staffed by 
departmental or agency representatives who have been trained in EOC operations. The 
head of the Coordination entity is the EMO Director. Personnel who are staffing the 
Coordination entity should, as much as practicable, have specific and unique responsibilities 
vis-a-vis the situation and should be discouraged from flitting about in areas where they 
have no experience or business. 
Public Affairs. The Public Affairs entity represents the formulation and release of 
information about the provinciallterritorial coordinated response to news reporters and 
broadcast stations, on approval from the Executive entity or its delegated representative 
entity, e.g., Planning and Advice. The Public Affairs entity's information processing 
functions include monitoring, as completely as practicable, ail relevant broadcasts on all 
networks and on al! communications means (Le., radio, TV, Internet); correcting errors in 
fact or misrepresented stories; and providing advice to the Executive entity with respect to 
misrepresented coverage. This entity should, as much as practicable, be staffed by 
provincialiterritorial public affairs specialists. The head of the Public Affairs entity should 
be the Director of provincialltemtorial public affairs. 
Triage. The Triage entity represents the collection of information, e.g., answering 
incoming calls, and the vetting and routing of information. It includes the imrnediate sorting 
and transfer of information according to its significance to the disaster circumstance and 
redirecting public inquiry calls to a location or entity within the larger integrated environment 
outside the EOCC framework. It can be staffed by anyone provided they have the proper 
indoctrinaüon, operator-manuals, and directories. The head of the Triage entity should be 
appointed by the EMO Director with input from the Executive entity. 
Third Ter - The Federal EOCC. The federal EOCC is established to coordinate the 
allocation of resources provided by the federal govemment on request from, and in support 
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of, the province or territory during a disaster event until such time as it can resume its 
routine operations unassisted. The federal EOCC has no direct control of resources and, 
therefore, is restricted to coordinating the rnovement and allocation of federal resources. 
In the same way the provincialltenitorial Executive entity is larger than the LA'S, the federal 
Executive entity is larger than the province's or temtory's. However, the structure remains 
identical to that at the first and second tiers, and the adjustrnents to the descriptions of the 
third tier's entities comprise changes in players' names only. The entitles remain wholly 
integrated and the suggestion that they otherwise be compartmentalized stands. 
Executive. The head of the federal Executive entity is the minister responsible for 
the Emergency ~ c t ?  The Executive entity is publicly accountable for the decisions they 
make. The federal Director of Emergency Preparedness Canada should be invited to 
attend the Executive entity's decision-making meetings in an advisory capacity. 
Plannina and Advice. The head of the Planning entity should be appointed by the 
Director of Emergency Preparedness Canada. 
Coordination. The head of the operations entity is the Director of Ernergency 
Preparedness Canada. 
Public Affairs. The Public Affairs entity represents the formulation and release of 
information about the federal coordinated response to news reporters and broadcast 
stations, on approval from the Executive entity or its delegated representative entity, e.g., 
Planning and Advice. The head of this entity should be the Director of federal public affairs. 
'* At the time of this writing, the Minister of National Defence is responsible for the 
Emergency Act. Although beyond the scope of this study, there appears to be difficulties with 
this arrangement in that other departmental ministers are not be as responsive to another 
minister as they would be to a higher level of authority; the Minister of National Defence's 
mandate conceming the employment of the Canadian Forces may, one day, place the minister in 
a tenuous situation; and the mitigation and recovery aspects of emergency management do not 
dovetail well with the mission of the Canadian Forces. Further study in the area of "where" 
Emergency Preparedness Canada should fit within the federal govemmental organizational 
structure is recommended. 
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Tiiaoe. The head of the T'age entity should be appointed by the Director of 
Emergency Preparedness Canada. 
Re~resentino the Framework in Diaararnmatic Fom. Figure 4 depicts the three tiers 
and the entities within them. 
IhlrdTier 
Federal 
Govemment 
EOCC 
seGmam 
Provincial or 
Territorial 
Govemrnent 
EOCC 
E M m t  
Local Authority 
€OC 
Figure 4 - Information Model Framework 
Note that the CaordinaUon enüty al  the Rnt Tfer could be entltled 'Operatlons' 
Fourth Tier? In theory, because al1 of the tiers are identically structured, it should 
be possible to add a fourth, International or Joint Coordination tier. There may be value in 
conducting research into the international aspects of emergency management to confimi 
whether the frarnework established in this study would apply at the United Nations, for 
example. 
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Establishing the Information Flows 
Based on the discussion at Chapter three, Figure 5 represents the possible intemal 
and extemal information flows irrespective of the tier. 
Figure 5 - Intemal and Externat Information Flow at T ier Level 
The framework established, the next step in the construction of the information 
rnodel is to overlay the information requirernents and flows detemined at Chapter three in 
order to determine, as closely as possible, the infomation fiows associated with each entity; 
to name them, and to describe the infomation they may cary. 
In order to better understand the movernent of information in and out of the 
emergency management system and the movement of information within the framework just 
established, diagrams serve a useful purpose. A series of them will be used to successively 
and progressively demonstrate the building of the model. 
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SSADM symbology conventions provide the basis used in the following information 
flow diagrams. For example, a rectangle divided into three parts represents an internai 
entity. It is given a number in order that further breakdowns, i.e., siblings of that entity can 
be numerically related to the parent. For example, if the Executive entity is numbered '1 ," 
the fint breakdown or sub-entity would be numbered "1.1 ," the second '1.2," and so on. 
Additional process information can be placed in the space provided above the entity name. 
An external entity is represented by an oval containing that entity's nominal description. 
The cut-line in the left-hand corner signifies plurality. 
Information fiows are depicted by an arrow whose arrowhead points to the 
destination entity. They are nominally labelled in order to better represent the information 
being transferred from one entity to another. 
Triaae. The Triage entity is the main point of information entry into the emergency 
management system. The information flows associated with the Triage entity mainly stem 
from external sources as well as from the entity itself. In the majority, the input flows are 
generated from the general public and become output flows once they are transferred to 
other extemal or intemal entities. For example, a citizen may generate a request for 
emergency transportation. This request is received, prioritized. and transferred to the 
appropriate destination. In this case, the request should have been made directly to the LA 
EOC and is redirected there without entering any other intemal entities. See Figure 6. 
Coordination. In the rnajority, the external incorning information flows are generated 
as requests from the lower tier Coordination entity and as status reports from collateral 
departments and agencies. The intemal incoming information fiows originate from the 
Triage and Plans and Advice entities. The information is processed and returned as 
oufflow. For a more complete Iist of the types of information that would be camed on 
incoming information fi ows see Appendix E, under the headings of 'Coordination," 'Support 
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Resources." 'Human Resources," and 'Communications." The information fiow diagram is 
below at Figure 7. 
Plannins and Advice. This entity's input and output fiows are represented at Figure 
8. For a more complete list of the types of information that would be camed on incoming 
information Rows see Appendix F, under the heading 'Plans." 
Executive. Although the Executive entity receives and sends information intemally 
and extemally throughout the emergency management systern, in theory, it should only 
communicate its goals andlor objectives to the Coordination entity through the Planning and 
Advice entity. The information flow diagram relating to the Executive entity as at Figure 9. 
Public Affairs. The Public Affairs entity is interconnected to each intemal entity and 
to many external entities. as depicted at Figure 10. Its incoming information flows would 
cany information such as that listed at Appendix E, under the heading 'Public Affairs." 
Consolidating Information Flow with Framework 
Consolidating the information flow diagrams into the previously established 
framework yields a model which more adequately serves the cross-jurisdictional and multi- 
agency effort usually associated with emergency response, irrespective of the nature of the 
disaster or its location. See Figure 1 1. 
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Figure 6 - Triage Information Flow Diagram 
PUBUC 
M A R S  
Figure 7 - Coordination Information Flow Diagram 
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Figure 8 - Planning and Advice Information Flow Diagram 
Figure 9 - Executive Information Flow Diagram 
Page 4-1 6 
GOALS 
Figure 10 - Public Affairs Information Flow Diagram 
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m a  
Federal 
Govemment 
S Q C P E ~ ~ B ~  
Provincial or 
Territorial 
Govemment 
F i r s t ~ i e r  
Local Authority 
Figure 1 1 - Cross Jurisdictional, Multi-Agency Modal 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUDING MATERIAL 
Emergency management is a complicated task often demanding extraordinary 
cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency coordination and cooperation. An example of this 
complexity was the Canadian portion of the 1997 Red River Basin flood. This disaster, 
which threatened more than 70 percent of the Province of Manitoba's population and 
caused the evacuation of approximately 28,000 of its residents, involved the federal 
govemment, 8,000 troops of the Canadian Forces, the Manitoba provincial govemment, 
seven rural municipalities, the City of Winnipeg, six towns, one lndian Reserve, several 
NGOs, church groups, the private sector, and several hundred thousand volunteers. 
The collective response to the 1997 flood was successful. however. And in the 
main, the perception of the citizens of Manitoba towards the massive cooperative effort was 
favourable. Nonetheless, a review of the formal after-action reports and the conduct of 
interviews with flood plain emergency coordinators revealed certain problems and criticisms, 
some of which dealt specifically with informational and decision-making issues. Many felt 
that central coordination across municipal, provincial and federal jurisdictions was lacking 
and that response activity, in general, was delayed. Others reported difftculties that were 
related to uncoordinated communications across municipal, provincial and federal 
jurisdictions; and complications that stemmed from the two models of delegating tasks and 
resources which coexisted but did not dove-tail well together, Le., the rigid and hierarchical 
'command and controln system used by the military, and the loose and flexible 'coordination 
and cooperation" system used by the emergency management structure. 
There was a consensus on the ideal that future responses must be based on better 
infomed decision-making and bettercoordinatedaction. This study was also in agreement. 
Consequently, it has contributed to the achievement of this ideal by proposing a simple and 
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effective cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information rnodel for emergency management. 
The study's sequence and structure followed h o  principles: 1 ) effective emergency 
management depends on how well decisions are made, and 2) good decisions depend on 
how well the supporthg infomation system captures and transfers rneaningful information 
frorn source to destination. 
While the problem, thesis, and methodology, were introduced in the first chapter, the 
study's second chapter was dedicated to the examination of decision-making. It discussed 
the subject in detail and showed that on whatever level and in whatever environment, 
choosing a course of action relies on gathedng and evaluating meaningful infomation. At 
the same üme, however, it also provided a clear differentiation between non-crisis and crisis 
decision-making. The analysis of decision-making theories in both the non-crisis and crisis 
contexts. for example, revealed that while some techniques work wellin normal, day-to-day 
operations and management, these would be unsatisfactory in the unceitain, time- 
pressured, high-stakes environment typical of crisis situations. The differences that were 
established by Chapter two are summarked at Table1 . 
The second chapter also explained that the efectiveness of decision-making in cnsis 
situations is, typically, directlypropoiüonal to the level of experience possessed by decision- 
makers, Le., the more the experience, the better the decision. However, experience alone 
is not enough to assure a satisfactory outcorne. Decision-makers must be aware of the 
inhibitors they face in order that they may take steps to guard against them. 
Miscommunication, for example, may jeopardize the entire decision-making process. 
Chapter hnio concluded that because sound decisions rely so heavily upon the collection 
and evaluation of information, a more detailed examination of information, as it relates to 
crisis management, was necessary. 
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Methodological, analytical, 
systematic, scientific. 
Pragrnatic. Focused on what 
must be accomplished. 
Relatively non-urgent. 
- - - -- - - - - -- 
Stable with established goals, 
noms and procedures. 
Deductive logical thinking, 
analysis of probabilities, 
statistical models. 
Allows for well-deliberated 
decisions, decision points, 
corrections and adjustrnents. 
In the majority, the literature 
involves a single, unified actor. 
ln the main, normative and 
prescriptive. 
High 
Institutional structure, 
procedures, the influence of 
power, social and cultural 
attitudes, professional 
standards, regional or national 
economic conditions, 
anticipated political 
developments, and the need 
to mobilize public support for 
outcomes, rnay restrict 
innovation and the choice of 
alternatives, 
Time is critical. 
Cornplex, ambiguous, unstable. 
High intensity. High potential 
for stress and fatigue. Missing 
information, tirne constraints, iII- 
defined, shiRing andior 
conflicting goals. Dynamic and 
continually changing 
conditions. Ill-structured tasks, 
high stakes, high emotions. 
Intuition, mental simulation, 
metaphors and analogies. 
Potential risk to life and 
property. Delay could mean 
loss of life or property. 
May involve many jurisdictions 
and many agencies. Team 
interaction. 
Cognition-based. Concerned 
about how decision-makers 
handle confusion and stress. 
Hig h 
Uncertain, ambiguous, and 
unique conditions. Cross- 
jurisdictional and rnulti-agency 
structure, rnissing or outdated 
procedures. Reliance on 
knowledge and experience. 
Decisions made dunng crisis 
are largely irreversible. 
i 
Table 1 - Non-Crisis and Crisis Decision Making in Contrast 
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Chapter three provided an analysis of the information requirements associated with 
an ernergency management system, suggested Iists of information requirernents for use at 
local, provincialltemtorial and federal leveis of govemment, proposed requirernent-driven 
recommendations in answer to the informational problems set out by Chapter one, and 
established the frarnework wherein a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency emergency 
management model, upon which to subsequently build an emergency management 
information systern, can be conceptualized. 
Although it was hoped that the interview questions posed to the former local 
ernergency coordinators would generate more meaningful data, the interviews were 
constrained by the time lapsed since the 1997 Red River Basin fi ood and by strong residual 
emotion. However, the rnost surprishg constraint experienced was that the majority of 
respondents had difficulty expressing andlor understanding the fundarnentals of 
EOClEOCC operations and identifying the information requirement that might have made 
the task easier to manage had they been in place. The general sentiment recorded during 
the interviews was that none of the respondents would be eager to act in the capacity of an 
emergency coordinator again due to the problems experienced. 
The interviews did, however, confirm the requirement of this study's aim. The 
absence of a standard emergency management information system spanning the 
jurisdictions of govemment and the boundaries of the many agencies involved in responding 
to emergencies was acknowledged, as was the ineffectiveness of those existing hierarchical 
diagrams that are intended to depict communication flow. 
Appendix F, which evolved in the course of Chapter three's developrnent, served to 
clarify Chapter one's Statement of the Problem by concisely listing each criticism found at 
the vanous 1997 Red River Basin flood after-action reports, along with its corresponding 
possible causes. As the analysis of the problems and their potential causes progressed, 
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it was detemined that the causal factors of one problem could themselveç be translated 
into problems. 
When a potential cause could be considered as a problem, it was copied to the 
"problem" column and analysed in tum. The process continued until a problem's cause 
finally revealed itself as a 'lack" of soma function or capability. The result of this analysis 
concluded that the informational and decision-making problems experienced during the Red 
River Basin flood of 1997 could be attributed to a lack of liaison personnel, a lack of training, 
education, and procedures, and, more genane to this study, a lack of an integrated 
emergency management information system or framework. Of the 34 problems associated 
to the management of the 199 Red River Basin flood response, 24 of them were shown to 
be directly related to the absence of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-ageocy emergency 
management information system. 
lndependent from the way the follow-on systern would actually function and the 
technology that would actually be used, the model is established at Chapter four. Based 
on the commonality of functions at each level of involvement, Chapter four builds a platform 
or tier which, in theory, should apply equally well to any level of government. Each tier 
includes five functional components or entities, namely: Executive, Coordination, Planning 
and Advice, Public Affain, and Tdage. 
Ovedaying the information requirements of Chapter three ont0 a tier offers a 
representation of intemal and extemal information flows. However, the study's objective 
of proposing a simple and effective cross-jurisdictional and multi-agency information model 
in support of decision-making is not met by this diagram (see Figure 5). The nature of 
information fiow in an emergency management information system is 3dimensional. It 
encompasses intemal and extemal inputs and outputs, as well as horizontal and vertical 
ones. 
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In order to simplify the model and to provide a standard upon which to build an 
emergency management information system, SSADM was chosen to provide the model 
building blocks and the basis for the terminology used as weli as for the textual and 
diagrammatic representations of the discussion. Information flows associated with each 
entity were determined and named to show the information each flow carries. Finally, the 
cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency model was presented as Figure 11. 
Its development was conducted from the highest level in order that a general and 
conceptual view of the intended information frarnework could be fully realised. The modelas 
interfaces were kept minimal and simple and information fiows were restricted to essentials. 
The main objective was that the mode1 must allow the unintempted and timely transfer of 
meaningful information to the intended destinations in a form useable upon receipt. 
In establishing the parameters for an integrated framework, it was determined that 
the model should reflect the Canadian emergency planning guidelines, which suggest an 
escalated emergency response starting with the Local Authority and moving progressively 
through the provinciallterritorial emergency response structure to the federal emergency 
response structure. Accordingly, the model was depicted using three tiers, each structured 
identically, based on the observation that al1 tiers are intended to accornplish the same 
objectives. 
In the course of this work's production, a number of areas requirhg more attention 
came to light. but were outside the scope of this study. They were, therefore, not discussed 
in any detail but are offered here as potential for further examination or study: 
Q Emergency management training and education are lacking. 
Specifically, attention is required in the areas of Emergency 
Management Structure, the Importanceof Liaison, EOC and EOCC 
Operations, Exercising and Simulation, the Use of Technology, the 
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Requirement for and Maintenance of Written Records, and Media 
Relations and lnterviewing Techniques. 
O Professional and standard qualifications are lacking for 
practitioners at all tevels of govemment emergency management 
involvement. 
O Standard ernergency operations procedures for use across the 
country are iacking. Each provinceiterritory and the federai 
govemment has its own way of conducting emergency 
management business. 
O The use of technology, e.g., GIS, Digital Mapping, Automated 
Emergency Management Support Systems, Logging and Tracking 
Programs, is not standardized across the country. Technolog ically, 
there is no vertical or horizontal interoperability between the three 
Ievels of government. 
0 The provincial/territorial EMOs are each located under different 
departments. There appears to be difficulty with these 
arrangements in that other departmental ministers may not be as 
responsive to another minister as they would be to a higher level 
of authority. Attention should be given to an organizational 
arrangement that would elevate the profile of emergency 
management while afYording it more 'enforceability." 
There appears to be a similar difficulty at the federal level, where 
EPC reports to the Minister of National Defence. Federal ministers 
do not willingly report laterally to another departmental minister. 
Other problems related to the location of EPC under DND relate to 
the difficulty in 'dovetailing" C2 and Cooperation and Coordination 
systems and to the difficulty of providing equal attention to the 
mitigation and recovery aspects of emergency management, which 
are not normally DND priorities. 
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O More focussed attention on correcting the existing inadequacies of 
the information system supporting al1 crisis decision-making and 
emergency management activities is required, including an 
evaluation of this study's proposed cross-jurisdictional, multi- 
agency information model. 
O A better understanding of the decision-making differences in crisis 
situations is required. It could be achieved through training and 
exercising decision-making unils, coriducling simulaüons, open- 
ended contingency planning, using psychological advisors in crisis 
decision-making staffs, and encouraging senior public officials to 
participate in training and preparatory exercises. 
O There is no provision for emergency management specialization in 
the field of Public Administration. The provision of emergency 
management cumclae is recommended. 
O Does the proposed model apply to the study of more global 
emergency management information requirements?. 
A standard emergency management information systern is recognized as being vital 
to practitioners and decision-makers alike. However, one does not exist. Where there are 
emergency management information systems, they are rnodelled against structural 
arrangements, which Vary from location to location, and are deemed inadequate. 
This study's proposed model, upon which an emergency management information 
system may eventually be built, is a starüng point towards achieving a standard which can 
be used across the country. However, before launching ont0 the design and 
implementation of the system, the rnodel must be fully tested against vanous scenarios 
(including worst-case ones), and practitioners and decision-maken that are usually involved 
in local €OC, provincial/temtotial and federal EOCCs must be involved in the testing 
process. 
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APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY 
Those communications ternis and definitions cited below that are based on the DOD Joint 
Staff Publication No. 1-02, 1994, Department of Defense Oiclionary of Military and 
Associated lems, are identified by the adjacent marking: [DODJS]. 
Those emergency management tenns and definitions cited below that are based on the 
FEMA Emergency Management lnstitute lndependent Study Course, 'The Emergency 
Program Manager," are identified by the adjacent marking: [FEMAISCI. 
Attribut8 
An information element used in the design 
phase of information systems to describe 
entities or relationships. 
Channel 
In a communications system. the part that 
connects a data source to a data sink. 
Cornmand and Control 
1. The process by which commanders 
plan, direct, control, and monitor any 
operation for which they are responsible 
(O Force C3,1995). 2. The establishment 
of cornmon intent and the transformation 
of comrnon intent into coordinated action 
(Pigeau and McCann, 1998). 
Command and Control System 
Military system used to support an action 
in response to a crisis. NATO defines this 
coordinathg structure by cornbining the 
definitions of each terrn. 
Communications [DODJS] 
The transfer of Information among users 
or processes, according to agreed 
conventions. 
Comrnunlcations System [DODJS] 
A collection of individual communications 
networks, transmission systems. relay 
stations, tributary stations, and data 
terminal equipment usually capable of 
interconnection and interoperation to f o m  
an integrated whole. Note: The 
components of a communications system 
serve a comrnon purpose, are technically 
compatible, use common procedures, 
respond to controls, and operate in 
unison. 
Data 
Representation of facts, concepts, or 
instructions in a fomalized manner 
suitable for communication. interpretation, 
or processing by humans or by automatic 
means. Any representations such as 
characters or analog quantities to which 
meaning is or might be assigned. 
Destination User 
In an information transfer transaction, the 
user that receives information from the 
source, Le., from the originating user. 
Emergency Operations Centre 
The single location where local 
emergency services department heads, 
municipal govemment officers and 
officiais, and volunteer agenices gather to 
oversee and to coordinate the on-site 
response to an emergency event. 
Externai organizations providing 
emergency services, assistance or 
resources to an emergency may also 
esta blish individual command or operation 
centres to track the allocation and status 
of their own resources. 
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Emergency Operations Coordination 
Centre 
The EOCC is established within provincial 
or territorial jurisdiction to coordinate the 
allocation of resources provided by the 
province or temtory on request from, and 
in support of, the LA during a disaster 
event until such time as the LA can 
resume its routine operations unassisted. 
Likewise, an EOCC is established within 
federal jurisdiction to coordinate the 
altocation of iederai resources on request 
from, and in support of, provinces or 
territoies. 
Entity 
1. An element of a conceptual infomation 
model representing a function, person, 
organization, department, cornputer 
system or anything else that sends or 
receives information. See User. 2. A 
class of objects, al1 of which can be 
described by the same attributes. 
Synonym: Source User. 
Emergency Site Management 
A coordinating structure used in Canada 
as the approximate equivalent to the 
lncident Cornmand System. It is based 
on a multi-tiered framework for 
communications, joint (or coordinated) 
decision-making, and the coordination of 
activities or resources. It does not intend 
to undermine, usurp or interfere with the 
C2 or ICS coordinating structures of the 
various response agencies. It intends 
instead to facilitate the interaction among 
the various crisis response organizations. 
Feedback 
A condition bearing infomation about the 
effect produced by the message and the 
consequences attributable to it (Gra ber, 
1992). 
lncident Command System [FEMAISC] 
The coordinating structure of choice of the 
US Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. It represents a model for 
responding and providing a means to 
coordinate the efforts of individual 
agencies as they work toward the 
cornmon goal of stabilizing a crisis, 
protecting life, property, and the 
environment. 
Information 
The meaning assigned to data by rneans 
of the known conventions used in their 
representation. Information consists of 
symbols (numbers, letters, words, 
graphics, etc.) that provide visualization 
or convey thought. It is generated from 
the collection, research, analysis, and 
arrangement of data to evaluate the 
underlying relationships between 
variables to draw new insights, to answer 
a question, to direct an activity, or to 
describe what has happened (Lindquist, 
1998; Graber, 1992). A given piece of 
information may be meaningless by itself; 
however, combining pieces of information 
produces ideas or provides knowledge. 
lnformation Anaiysis 
A function of the information system in 
which information is subjected to review in 
order to identify significant facts for 
subsequent interpretation. 
Information Collection (Acqufsition) 
[DODJS] 
The obtaining of information in any 
manner, including direct observation, 
liaison with official agencies, or 
solicitation from official, unoffkial, or 
public sources. 
lnfonnation Flow 
A route by which information travels from 
one element of an information fow 
diagram to another. Information flows are 
represented by arrows which begin at the 
source entity and points to the destination 
entity. 
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Information Flow Diagram 
A representaüon defining the passage of 
information through a system or model. 
lnformation Fusion 
Reducing information to the minimum 
essentials and putting it in a f o m  upon 
which decision-makers can act. 
Information Management 
The careful planning and controlled steps 
necessarj tc achieve %e ptiqose for which 
information is generated (Graber, 1992). 
information Processing [DODJS] 
The systematic performance of operations 
upon information such as handling, 
merging, sorting, and computing. Note: 
The semantic content of the original data 
should not be changed. The semantic 
content of the processed data may be 
changed. 
Information Store 
An element of a conceptual of a 
conceptual informat ion model 
representing a repository for information 
within the information system being 
modelled. 
Infornation System [DODJS] 
1. An interdependent collection of 
functions through which information is 
acquired, analyzed, processed, 
transferred, managed, and made 
available to decision-makers for action. It 
is conceptualized as a construct that 
operates, either manual ly or 
automatically, within an environment 
(personnel, facilities, standard operating 
procedures, regulations, etc.), and in 
relation to other systems in use during the 
crisis circumstance. Although the 
outcorne of the system's activity is 
decision-making, the decisions cannot be 
determined precisely. 2. Any 
communications andlor cornputer related 
equipment or interconnected system or 
subsysterns of equipment that is used in 
the acquisition, storage, manipulation, 
management, movement, control, display, 
switching, interchange, transmission, or 
reception of voice andlor data, and 
includes software, ftrmware, and 
hardware. 
lnformation Systern Management [DODJS] 
Network management functions extended 
to include user end instruments. 
Information Transfer [DODJSJ 
The process of moving information from 
from a source to a sink or to a destination 
user. 
lnterconnection [DODJS] 
1. The linking together of interoperable 
systems. 2. The linkage used to join two 
or more communications units, such as 
systems, networks, links, nodes, 
equipment, circuits, and devices. 
Language 
A set of characters, conventions, and 
rules that is used for conveying 
information. 
Liaison 
The contact or communications 
maintained between elements of the 
emergency response structure that 
ensure mutual understanding and unity of 
purpose and action. 
Meaning 
The representation of both, the concept of 
language, i.e., semantics, agreed 
understanding, cornmon terminology, and 
intent. 
Medium [DODJS] 
In communications, the transmission path 
along which a signal propagates, such as 
a wire pair, coaxial cable, waveguide, 
optical fibre, or radio path. 
Message [DODJS] 
1. Any thought or idea expressed bnefly, 
using language, prepared in a forrn 
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suitable for transmission by any means of 
communication. Note: A message may be 
a one-unit message or a multi-unit 
message. 2. In communications, record 
infomlation expressed using language 
and prepared in a format specified for 
intended t ransmiss ion  by a 
communications system. 3. An arbitrary 
amount of information whose beginning 
and end are defined or implied. 
Mitigatlon [FEMAISC] 
A phase of emergency management. Any 
activities which actually eliminate or 
reduce the chance of occurrence of the 
effects of a disaster. Also includes long- 
term activities which reduce the effects of 
unavoidable disasters. 
Preparedness [FEMAISC] 
A phase of emergency management. 
Preparedness activities are necessary to 
the extent that mitigation measures have 
not, or cannot. prevent disasters. In the 
preparedness phase, governments, 
organizations. and individuals develop 
response plans and work to increase 
available resources, before the onset of a 
disaster. Preparedness activity is 
designed to Save lives and minimize 
damage to property by preparing people 
to respond appropriately. The necessary 
components of an appropriate response 
are a response plan. trained personnel. 
and necessary resources. Preparedness 
measures also seek to enhance disaster 
response operations. 
Recovery [FEMAISC] 
A phase of emergency management. Any 
activities undertaken to retum vital life 
support systems to minimum operating 
standards, in the near terni; in the longer 
term, recovery activities continue until al1 
systems retum to normal or near normal, 
i.e., until the entire disaster area is 
completely redeveloped, either as it was 
in the past or for entirely new purposes 
that are less disaster-prone. 
Relations hip 
A descriptive element of the conceptual 
information model, representing an 
association of two or more entities. 
Response [FEMAISC] 
A phase of emergency management. Any 
activities designed to provide emergency 
assistance to victims of a disaster, as 
immediately as practicable, to reduce the 
likelihood of secondary damage, and to 
speed recovery operations. 
Sink [DODJS] 
In communications, a device that receives 
information, control. or other signals from 
a source. 
Source User [DODJS] 
The user providing the information to be 
transferred to a destination user during a 
particular information transfer transaction. 
System [DO D JS] 
Any organized assembly of resources 
(including personnel and equipment) and 
procedures united and regulated by 
interaction or interdependence to 
accomplish a set of specific functions. 
System Analysis 
A systematic investigation of a real or 
planned system to determine the 
functions of the system and how they 
relate to each other and to any other 
systern. 
Telecommunication [DODJS] 
1. Any transmission, emission, or 
reception of signs, signals, wnting, 
images and sounds or intelligence of any 
nature by wire, radio, optical or other 
electromagnetic systems. 2. Any 
transmission, emission, or reception of 
signs. signals, writings, images, sounds, 
or information of any nature by wire, 
radio, visual, or other electromagnetic 
systerns, 
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Transmission [DODJS] 
1. The dispatching, for reception 
elsewhere, of a signal, message, or other 
form of information. 2. The propagation of 
a signal, message, or other form of 
information by any means, such as by 
telegraph, telephone, radio, television, or 
facsimile via any medium, such as wire, 
coaxial cable, microwave, optical fibre, or 
radio frequency. 3. In communications 
systems, a series of data units, such as 
blocks, messages, or frames. 
Transmission Medium [DODJSJ 
Any material substance, such as fiber- 
optic cable, twisted-wire pair, coaxial 
cable, dielectric-slab waveguide, water, 
and air, that can be used for the 
propagation of signals, usually in the form 
of rnodulated radio, light, or acoustic 
waves, from one point to another. Note: 
By extension, free space can also be 
considered a transmission medium for 
electromagnetic waves, although it is not 
a material medium. 
User 
A penon, organization, or other entity 
(including a computer or computer 
systern), that employs the information 
transfer services provided by an 
information system. Note: A user 
functions as a source or final destination 
of information, or both. 
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APPENDIX 8 - QUESTIONNAIRE INTENDED FOR THE LOCAL AUTHORITY 
Rural Municipality (Interna1 Communication} 
How was the RM's emergency response to the Red River Basin Rood of 1997 
controlled andlor coordinated? 
Who staffed the RM EOC? 
Which RM agencies were involved in responding to the event? 
What were the communication links from the EOC to the RM agencies involved? 
How did the €OC cornrnunicate to the RM agencies involved? 
What were the communication requirements at the EOC from the RM agencies 
involved? 
Which communities within the RM were involved in responding to the event? 
How were their emergency responses controlled andlor coordinated? 
Who staffed their EOCs? 
What were the communication links from the RM EOC to the community EOCs? 
How did the RM EOC communicate to the community EOCs? 
What situational information did the EOC demand? How and by whorn were these 
communicated to the €OC? 
Page 5 1  
Private Sector Communication 
13 Which pnvate sector organizations were involved in responding to the event at the 
RM level? 
14 What were the communication links from the €OC to the private sector 
organizations? 
15 How did the EOC comrnunicate to the private sector organizations involved? 
Nefghbouring RM Communication 
16 How did the neighbouring RMs assist you in your response to the event? 
17 What were the communication links from the EOC to the neighbouring RMs? 
18 How did the EOC communicate to the neighbouring RMs? 
19 What were the channels of cornmunicationa between the RM and the media? 
20 Which were the provincial agenciesldepartments involved prior to a request being 
made to the province for assistance? 
Provincial Communication (before request) 
21 What were the communication links from the €OC to the provincial 
agenciesldepartments involved? 
22 How did the EOC cornmunicate to the provincial agenciesldepartments involved? 
23 What were the communication requirements at the EOC from the provincial 
agenciesldepartments involved? 
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Volunteer AgencylNGO Communfcatlon 
24 Which were the volunteer agenciesINGOs involved within the RM? 
25 What were the communication links from the EOC to the volunteer agencieslNGOs 
involved? 
26 How did the €OC communicate to the volunteer agencieslNGOs involved? 
27 What were the communication requirernents at the €OC from the volunteer 
agencieslNGOs involved? 
Federal Communication (before official provincial involvement) 
28 Which were the federal agenciesldepartments involved prior to a request being 
made by the province for assistance? 
29 What were the communication links from the EOC to the federal 
agenciesldepartments involved? 
30 How did the EOC communicate to the federal agenciesldepartments involved? 
31 What were the communication requirements at the EOC from the federal 
agenciesldepartments involved? 
Other Communications 
32 What other extemal information requirement did the EOC demand? How and by 
whom were these communicated to the EOC? 
33 How was ail the information required by the EOC stored? 
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Communication (after official provincial involvement) 
Once the province's support was requeste-d and in place, what constituted the 
information pipeline between the EOC and the EOCC? 
Once the province's support was requested and in place, what changes were there 
in communication channels between the RM and the private sectof? 
Between the RM and previously established links with neighbouring RMs or others? 
Between the RM and the media? 
Between the RM and previously established communication links with provincial 
agenciesldepartrnents? 
Between the RM and previously established communication links with volunteer 
agenciesINGOs? 
Between the RM and previously established communication links with federal 
agenciesldepartments? 
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APPENDIX C - LETTER OF INTRODUCTION T O POTENTIAL INTERVIEW 
CANDIDATES 
OF MANITOBA 
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APPENDIX D - RESOURCE INFORMATION REQUIRED AT THE LOCAL LNEL' 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
Fire 
Police 
Ambulance 
Public Utilities 
Public Works 
MED!CAL 
Hospitals 
Clinics 
Doctors 
Dentists 
Nurses 
Nurçing Homes 
Veterinarians 
Medical Associations 
ASSEMBLY AREAS 
Parks 
Parking Lots 
Shopping Centres 
Schools 
Churches 
Govemment Buildings 
Warehouses 
Community Centres 
TRANSPORTATION 
Buses 
Trucks 
Vans 
4 Wheel Drive Vehicles 
Tractor Trailors 
Taxis 
Power Boats 
Airplanes 
Snowmobiles 
Swamp Buggies 
Helicopters 
SUPPUES 
Food 
Clothing 
Sand 
MEDIA 
Newspapers 
Radio Stations 
Television Stations 
News Services 
INDNIDUALS 
Clergy 
Local Officiais 
Pilots 
Amateur Radio Operators 
Building Contractors 
EQUIPMENT 
Farm Tractors 
Construction Equipment 
Excavation Equipment 
Chain Saws 
Portable Power Plants (Generators) 
Oxygen Tanks 
SERVICE AGENCIES 
Red Cross 
Salvation Army 
St. John's Ambulance 
 COMMUN^ GROUPS 
PTA 
Charnber of Commerce 
Boy Scouts 
Girl Guides 
Kiwanis 
Lions Club 
Churches 
t Based on FEMA, n.d., p. 4-39. 
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APPENDIX E - INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AT PROVINCIAUTERRITORIAL 
AND FEDERAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT ' 
What are the applicable policies, procedures, regulations, legislation 
How can the planners at the other tevels of government be contacted 
What are the overall priorities for response activities 
What is the status of upcoming activities 
What are the task-related restrictions and constraints 
What is the status of the systerns providing power and potable water to the 
affected area 
What are the estimates of the potential impact of the crisis 
What are the needs and damage assessments 
What are the disaster area boundaries 
What are the social, economic, and political impacts 
What are the jurisdictional boundaries 
What is the status of transportation systems and critical transportation 
facilities 
What is the status of communication systerns 
What are the access points, access roads, and entries to the disaster site 
What is are the hazard-specific scientific andlor technical considerations 
(Le., modes of exposure, chronic and acute effects, signs and syrnptoms 
of exposure, rehabilitation requirements, emergency and follow-up medical 
treatment and surveillance) 
What are the health and safety considerations (e.g., protective equipment, 
decontamination and waste disposai requirements, emergency medicai 
treatment) 
What are the evacuation procedures and temporary shelter needs 
What are the current and predicted weather forecasts 
1 Note: This list is not all-inclusive. Rather, it is only intended to represent the type of 
information that may be required at provinciaUtemtoria1 and federal governments. 
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O What are the area's geographic, geophysical, and demographic 
descriptions 
5 What maps, schernatics, and diagrams are being used; how can these be 
obtained and distributed 
Q What are the major issues and activities of ptans activation 
Cl What is the status of plans activation 
O What is the status of disaster or emergency dedarations 
O Who are the emergency coordinators at the other levels of government and 
how can they be contacted (Le., telephone numbers, e-mail addresses) 
C l  What is the status of operations 
CI What are the operational priorities and requirernents 
U What is the status of resources 
Q What are the jurisdictions involved and who are the agencies, departrnents, 
NGOs, and public sector organizations involved 
O Who are the representatives of the agencies, departments, NGOs, and 
public sector organizations involved 
SUPPORT RESOURCES 
O What are the resource requirements 
O What resources are available 
O Who controls the necessary resources (Le., LA, neighbouring cornrnunity, 
public sector, department, agency, NGO); how are these control authorities 
contacted (Le., telephone numbers, e-mail address, address) 
Q What are the procedures for obtaining necessary resources 
U What is the status of critical resources 
0 What are the additional sources of support resources (Le., consultants, 
contractors); how can these be contacted (i.e., telephone numbers, fax 
nurnbers, email addresses, addresses) 
O Who are trained as Liaison Officers and how can they be contacted (Le., 
tetep hone numbers, e-mail addresses, addresses) 
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O Who are the departmental emergency coordinators and how can they be 
contacted (Le., telephone nurnbers, e-mail addresses, addresses) 
O What is the status of key personnel 
O Who are the regulatory and other personnel having special knowledge and 
experience relevant to health and safety and response operations; how can 
they be contacted (Le., telephone numbers, e-mai1 address, address) 
What are the communication requirements (Le., how many networks, who 
are the subscribers, how are they interwnnected) 
What are the available communication rneans (Le., land-line telephone, 
radio, cellular telephone, satellite telephone, intemet, fax) 
What are the available communication equiprnent and systems 
What are the avaifable radio frequencies and how are they acquired 
What are the standard communication procedures and protocols for cross- 
jurisdictional and multi-agency use 
What communications security measures are required (i.e., protection of 
information, redundancy of systerns) 
What are the procurement procedures for additional equipment and 
systems 
What are the equipment and systern environmental and operating 
requirernents 
What user training is required for communication equipment and system 
use 
O What are the relevant press services, newspapers, TV stations, and radio 
stations; how can they be contacted (Le., telephone numbers, fax numbers, 
e-mail addresses, addresses) 
Q What is the available background material and how can it be quickly 
accessed and disserninated 
O Who are the experts and others with whom the media can consult for 
technical details and for verification of information; how can they be 
contacted (Le., telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, addresses) 
Cl How can the other Public Affairs coordinators at the other levels of 
govemment be contacted 
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Difficulty was encountered obtaining information 
from provincial departrncnts. 
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Each provincial department was perceived as 
wanting to be the expert. 
.." . I$' , ;;iill , , . municipality responsibilities. 
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, ., , . 
Failure to provide central coordination. 
The province was perceived to have conducted 
"unilateral" decision-ma king and "usurpedn 
Information was not properly shared (see 4). 
Each provincial department was perceived as wanting to be the expert. 
Difficulty was encountered obtaining information from provincial departments. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information mode1 and corresponding 
information system. 
- - - 
Failure to provide central coordination. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information rnodel and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Information was treated as proprietary (see 1). 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictionôl, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Information was treated as proprietary (see 1). 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system, 
. . - . .. . . . . . . . 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information systern. 
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lnformation was treated as proprietary (see 1 ). 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Failure to establish clear authority for the release of information to the media. 
Each provincial department seemed to run indepenclently and had its own 
interna1 source of information and relied solely on its own field people to gather 
intelligence (see 2). 
Provincial authorities were not pro-active with the media and media interviews 
needed to be better planned, 
Measures to prevent rumours and to quash "informain information networks were 
not tahen. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
-- -- -- 
Lack of training and educalion. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of training and education. 
Information was treated as proprietary (see 1). 
Provincial authorities were not pro-active with the media and media interviews 
needed to be better planned (see 15) 
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LAS were al1 treated as though they al1 faced the 
same threat. had the sarne response capabilities, 
and faced ldentical impacts. 
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Lack of training and education. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Information was treated as proprietary (see 1). 
Lack of LO. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Shortage of personnel. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of LO (see 20). 
Lack of LO (see 20). 
Each provincial department seemed to run independently and had its own 
interna1 source of information and relied solely on its own field people to gather 
intelligence (see 2). 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
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Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictionai, multi-agency information modei and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of training, education, and procedures, 
Lack of training, education, and procedures. 
Lack of training, education, and procedures. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of procedures. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information model and corresponding 
information system. 
Lack of a cross-jurisdictional, multi-agency information mode1 and corresponding 
information system. 
Failure to provide central coordination (see 7). 
Failure to provide central coordination (see 7). 
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lmproperly 'packaged" information received a l  the 
EOCC, 
Overwhelming information throughput at the 
EoCC, 
, nordinate amount of verbal vs. written 
information. 
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No U.S. flood information communjcated to 
southernmost LAS. 
Delayed arriva1 of information. 
Ernergency response struclure problems. 
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Too rnany political cornmittees overseeing the 
response operations. 
Two detegation and tasking structures CO-existing 
but not dove-tail well 
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